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REGULATORY LITIGATION IN THE EUROPEAN
UNION: DOES THE U.S. CLASS ACTION
HAVE A NEW ANALOGUE?
S.I. Strong*
The United States has long embraced the concept of regulatory litigation, whereby individual litigants, often termed “private attorneys general,”
are allowed to enforce certain public laws as a matter of institutional design.
Although several types of regulatory litigation exist, the U.S. class action is
often considered the paradigmatic model for this type of private regulation.
For years, the United States appeared to be the sole proponent of both
regulatory litigation and large-scale litigation. However, in February 2012,
the European Union dramatically reversed its existing policies toward mass
claims resolution when the European Parliament adopted a resolution proposing to create a coherent European approach to cross- border collective
redress. Given certain conceptual similarities between cross-border collective
redress and global class actions, the question logically arises as to whether the
European Union is in the process of embracing a form of regulatory
litigation.
This issue is of great importance not only to European audiences who
may have to recalibrate their thinking about what constitutes “regulation”
within the European sphere, but also to American audiences who will have to
consider how the new European procedures affect the ability of U.S. courts to
 2012 S.I. Strong. Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce and
distribute copies of this Article in any format at or below cost, for educational
purposes, so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre
Dame Law Review, and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
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bring European parties into global class actions. Although many of the
issues may appear to be procedural in nature, the more interesting—and
challenging—analyses arise as a matter of regulatory law.
This Article is the first to consider the European resolution from a regulatory perspective, using a combination of new governance theory and equivalence functionalism to determine whether the European Union has adopted
or is in the process of adopting a form of regulatory litigation. In so doing,
the Article considers a number of issues, including the basic definition of
regulatory litigation, how class and collective relief can act as a regulatory
mechanism, and the special problems that arise when regulatory litigation is
used in the transnational context. The Article also includes a normative
element, providing a number of suggestions on how European authorities—
who are still in the early stages of drafting the relevant procedures—can
better achieve the regulatory and other objectives set forth in the resolution.
Through these means, the Article makes a significant contribution not only
to the domestic understanding of regulatory law, but also to the increasingly
important field of transnational regulation. Audiences in both the United
States and the European Union, as well as readers from other countries, can
benefit greatly from this analysis.

I.

INTRODUCTION

For decades, Europe and the United States have been characterized as representing opposite ends of the spectrum with regard to
their approach to regulation.1 The United States has traditionally
been seen as embracing a mixed model of shared public-private
authority, with individual litigants being permitted, if not encouraged,
to act as “private attorneys general” and enforce various public laws in
an otherwise highly deregulated market environment.2 European
nations, on the other hand, have been painted as preferring a more
formal regulatory model that includes a large number of legislative
and administrative enactments that deny both the need and opportunity for any sort of “private” regulation through litigation.3
1 “There is no consensus in policy or academic circles as to what exactly is connoted by the term regulation.” Colin Scott, Privatization and Regulatory Regimes, in
Oxford Handbook of Public Policy 651, 653 (Michael Moran et al. eds., 2006). One
classic definition states that regulation involves “sustained and focused control exercised by a public agency over activities that are socially valued,” although modern
critics have expanded the scope of application to include regulatory activity undertaken by private actors and other decentralized entities. See id. (citing Phillip Selznick, Focusing Organizational Research on Regulation, in REGULATORY POLICY AND THE
SOCIAL SCIENCES 363, 363 (Roger G. Noll ed., 1985)).
2 See John S. Coffee, Jr., Litigation Governance: Taking Accountability Seriously, 110
COLUM. L. REV. 288, 344 (2010); see also J. Maria Glover, The Structural Role of Private
Enforcement Mechanisms in Public Law, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1137, 1140 (2012).
3 See Coffee, supra note 2, at 345.
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While these stereotypes may still exist in the popular mindset,
“[c]omparative studies of developments in regulatory law and policy
in Western states over the past three decades have shown a widespread
movement away from a top-down approach in public governance to
an increasingly hybrid interaction of public and private actors.”4 This
is intriguing, not just from an academic perspective, but also as a practical matter, since it suggests that European nations may be adopting
what could be seen as a more Americanized model of regulation.5
However, it is dangerous to read these developments too robustly,
since the mere fact that other nations are increasing the role of private actors in their regulatory schemes does not necessarily mean that
those jurisdictions are adopting U.S. regulatory methods and mechanisms per se.6
One area of particular interest involves the use of large-scale litigation to achieve certain regulatory ends. This technique, often
referred to as “regulatory litigation,” arises when a “diffuse set of regulators,” including “private citizens, public regulatory bodies, nongovernmental organizations, and private market agents[,] . . . regulate
social harm”7 by “us[ing] litigation and the courts to achieve and
apply regulatory outcomes to entire industries.”8
One of the best known forms of regulatory litigation is the U.S.
class action.9 While the regulatory elements of class action litigation
4 Peer Zumbansen, Sustaining Paradox Boundaries: Perspectives on Internal Affairs in
Domestic and International Law, 15 EUR. J. INT’L L. 197, 201 (2004) (reviewing A. CLAIRE
CUTLER, PRIVATE POWER AND GLOBAL AUTHORITY (2003)); see also Scott, supra note 1,
at 652 (recognizing that “regulation occurs within ‘regimes’ characterized by diffuse
populations and of actors and considerable diversity in the norms and mechanisms of
control”).
5 See Francesca Bignami, Cooperative Legalism and the Non-Americanization of European Regulatory Styles: The Case of Data Privacy, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 411, 412, 414–15
(2011); R. Daniel Kelemen, Suing for Europe: Adversarial Legalism and European Governance, 39 COMP. POL. STUD. 101, 102 (2006).
6 See Bignami, supra note 5, at 412, 414–15 (referring to the European model as
“cooperative legalism”).
7 Glover, supra note 2, at 1146.
8 Patrick Luff, Risk Regulation and Regulatory Litigation, 64 RUTGERS L. REV. 73, 96
(2011) (quoting ANDREW P. MORISS ET AL., REGULATION BY LITIGATION 1 (2009)).
9 However, not all class actions operate in a regulatory manner. See RACHAEL
MULHERON, THE CLASS ACTION IN COMMON LAW LEGAL SYSTEMS 63, 63–66 (2004); see
also infra Part III.B.I. Class actions are not the only type of regulatory litigation. See
Miriam H. Baer, Choosing Punishment, 92 B.U. L. REV. 577, 612–25 (2012) (discussing
the role of the Department of Justice (DOJ), the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and state attorneys general as well as shareholder litigation, which is considered the weakest and “most controversial” of the various forms of regulatory
litigation); Glover, supra note 2, at 1190–91 (discussing enforcement mechanisms in
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give rise to few issues in domestic disputes, the device’s regulatory
potential has caused a number of difficulties in cases involving multinational classes.10 For example, U.S. judges not only have to consider how regulatory efforts initiated by private actors in U.S. courts
should or will be considered in countries that only allow traditional
forms of regulation,11 judges also have to take into account what the
legal, political, and economic ramifications of these so-called “regulatory mismatches” will be at both the national and international
levels.12
These tasks obviously go far beyond what trial judges are usually
expected to do.13 Nevertheless, U.S. courts are being asked to address
these sorts of issues with increasing frequency, since the forces of
globalization are not only driving up the number and diversity of mass
multinational injuries but also the number of ways in which those injuries can be said to affect U.S. parties and U.S. interests (and hence
attract the jurisdiction of U.S. courts).14
the Racketeer Influenced and Corporate Organizations (RICO) Act); Luff, supra note
8, at 113 (discussing both “top-down” and “bottom-up” regulatory legislation);
Timothy Meyer, Comment, Federalism and Accountability: State Attorneys General, Regulatory Litigation, and the New Federalism, 95 CAL. L. REV. 885, 886 (2007) (discussing state
attorneys general).
10 See Hannah L. Buxbaum, Multinational Class Actions Under Federal Securities Law:
Managing Jurisdictional Conflict, 46 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 14, 67 (2007) [hereinafter
Buxbaum, Securities]; Hannah L. Buxbaum, Transnational Regulatory Litigation, 46 VA.
J. INT’L L. 251, 309–17 (2006) [hereinafter Buxbaum, Transnational]; Richard A.
Nagareda, Aggregate Litigation Across the Atlantic and the Future of American Exceptionalism, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1, 41–52 (2009).
11 These issues affect questions regarding international enforceability of a class
action judgment as well as the initial certification of the class. See Tanya J. Monestier,
Transnational Class Actions and the Illusory Search for Res Judicata, 86 TUL. L. REV. 1,
78–79 (2011); Rhonda Wasserman, Transnational Class Actions and Interjurisdictional
Preclusion, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 313, 313–16 (2011).
12 See Nagareda, supra note 10, at 13; see also infra Part II.
13 See Monestier, supra note 11, at 79 (“The complexity of foreign law on the
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments generally, as well as the lack of
comparable class procedures elsewhere, greatly limits the ability of a U.S. court to
ascertain whether or not a U.S. class judgment would be enforceable in a given foreign court.”); Wasserman, supra note 11, at 313 (“As global markets have expanded
and transborder disputes have multiplied, American courts have been pressed to certify transnational class actions. . . .”).
14 These issues have led to a flood of commentary. See Deborah Hensler, How
Economic Globalisation is Helping to Construct a Private Transnational Legal Order, in THE
LAW OF THE FUTURE AND THE FUTURE OF THE LAW 249, 250–59 (Sam Muller et al. eds.,
2011) [hereinafter Hensler, Future]; George A. Bermann, U.S. Class Actions and the
“Global Class,” 19 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 91, 94 (2009) (discussing the potential for
“inter-jurisdictional conflict” and the worry about whether U.S. class action judgments
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The situation has become even more complicated in recent years
because the United States is no longer the only country in the world
to provide for large-scale litigation in its domestic courts.15 Over the
last ten years, numerous countries in both the common law and civil
law traditions have adopted various forms of class and collective
redress as a matter of national law.16 While some of these procedures
provide for opt-out representative relief in a manner similar to that
reflected in U.S. class actions, other devices differ significantly as a
matter of both form and function.17
Given Europe’s traditional antipathy toward both regulatory litigation and U.S. class actions, it might seem as if Europe would be the
last region in the world to embrace any type of collective relief.18 As it
turns out, sixteen of the twenty-seven European Member States now
provide for some form of large-scale litigation as a matter of national
law,19 with collective relief also being made available in a number of
will be recognized and enforced abroad); Buxbaum, Securities, supra note 10, at 35
(discussing forum non conveniens); Stephen J. Choi & Linda J. Silberman, Transnational Litigation and Global Securities Class Actions, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 465 (2009); John
C.L. Dixon, The Res Judicata Effect in England of a US Class Action Settlement, 46 INT’L &
COMP. L.Q. 134 (1997); Rachael Mulheron, The Recognition, and Res Judicata Effect, of
a United States Class Actions Judgment in England: A Rebuttal of Vivendi, 75 MOD. L. REV.
180, 181–82 (2012) [hereinafter Mulheron, Vivendi]; Nagareda, supra note 10, at
11–12; Linda Sandstrom Simard & Jay Tidmarsh, Foreign Citizens in Transnational Class
Actions, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 87, 89 n.70 (2011) (discussing economic issues relating to
global class actions); Mark Stiggelbout, The Recognition in England and Wales of United
States Judgments in Class Actions, 52 HARV. INT’L L.J. 433 (2011).
15 See 622 THE ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE (Deborah Hensler et al. eds., 2009) [hereinafter THE ANNALS] (discussing thirty
different jurisdictions); see also Deborah R. Hensler, The Globalization of Class Actions:
An Overview, in THE ANNALS, supra, at 7, 15–17.
16 See Hensler, supra note 15, at 7; see also THE ANNALS, supra note 15.
17 Procedures range from other types of representative relief (such as that which
is available only on an opt-in basis, only with respect to certain substantive areas of
law, only with respect to injunctive relief, and/or only at the instigation of an
approved intermediary entity such as a government association or non-government
organization) to aggregate and settlement only relief. See Hensler, supra note 15, at 8,
13–17.
18 See Coffee, supra note 2, at 345.
19 See DIRECTORATE GENERAL FOR INTERNAL POLICIES, OVERVIEW OF EXISTING COLLECTIVE REDRESS SCHEMES IN EU MEMBER STATES 38 (2011) [hereinafter Directorate
General], available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/
201107/20110715ATT24242/20110715ATT24242EN.pdf (noting European Member
States have adopted four general types of collective redress: “group and representative
actions, test case procedures and procedures for skimming off profits”); see also
Filippo Valguarnera, Legal Tradition as an Obstacle: Europe’s Difficult Journey to Class
Action, 10 GLOBAL JURIST 1, 8–19 (2010).

R

R

R

R
R

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\88-2\NDL208.txt

904

unknown

Seq: 6

notre dame law review

12-FEB-13

16:10

[vol. 88:2

specific subject matter areas as a matter of European law.20 However,
the most significant development in this field comes as a result of a
resolution adopted by the European Parliament in February 2012
(Resolution) calling for the creation of a coherent European
approach to collective redress in cross-border disputes.21
Because European legislation only applies to European actors,
the Resolution might initially appear to be of limited applicability
outside the European Union.22 However, U.S. parties and U.S. courts
need to be aware of these developments for several reasons. First, the
European Union’s primary form of legislation concerning cross-bor20 See Directive 2004/35, of the European Parliament and the Council of 21 April
2004 on Environmental Liability with Regard to the Prevention and Remedying of
Environmental Damage, 2004 O.J. (L 143) (EC), available at http://eur-lex.europa.
eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2004:143:0056:0075:en:PDF; Directive
2005/29, of the European Parliament and the Council of 11 May 2005 Unfair Commercial Practices Directive, 2005 O.J. (L 149) (EC), available at http://www.esma.
europa.eu/system/files/2005_29_EC.pdf; Directive 2004/48, of the European Parliament and the Council of 29 April 2004 on the Enforcement of Intellectual Property
Rights, 2004 O.J. (L 195) (EC), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/
LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2004:157:0045:0086:en:PDF; Directive 2000/35, of the European Parliament and the Council of 29 June 2000 on Combating Late Payment in
Commercial Transactions, 2000 O.J. (L 200) (EC), available at http://eur-lex.europa.
eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2000:200:0035:0038:en:PDF; Directive 98/
27, of the European Parliament and the Council of 19 May 1998 on Injunctions for
the Protection of Consumers’ Interests, 1998 O.J. (L 166) (EC), available at http://
eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:1998:166:0051:0055:EN:PDF;
Directive 93/13, of the European Parliament and the Council of 5 April 1993 on
Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts, 1993 O.J. (L 95) (ECC), available at http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31993L0013:en:HTML; see
also White Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules, COM (2008) 165
final (Apr. 2, 2008); Green Paper on Consumer Collective Redress, COM (2008) 794 final
(Nov. 27, 2008) [hereinafter Green Paper on Consumer Collective Redress]; European Parliament, Resolution of 2 February 2012 on “Towards a Coherent European
Approach to Collective Redress,” P7_TA-PROV (2012) 0021, ¶¶ 10–14 [hereinafter
Resolution], available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-/
/EP//TEXT+TA+P7-TA-2012-0021+0_DOC+XML+V0//EN; Christopher Hodges,
European Union Legislation, in THE ANNALS, supra note 15, at 78–85 [hereinafter
Hodges, ANNALS].
21 See Resolution, supra note 20. The Resolution was adopted following a public
consultation from the European Commission and an own initiative report from the
European Parliament. See Public Consultation: Towards a Coherent European Approach to
Collective Redress, SEC (2011) 173 final (Feb. 4, 2011) (EC) [hereinafter Public Consultation], available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/news/consulting_public/0054/sec_
2011_173_en.pdf; Committee on Legal Affairs Report, 12 January 2012, “Towards a
Coherent European Approach to Collective Redress,” 2011/2089 (INI) [hereinafter
Lehne Report], available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef
=-//EP//NONSGML+REPORT+A7-2012-0012+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN.
22 See Resolution, supra note 20.
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der procedure, Council Regulation 44/2001 on jurisdiction and the
recognition and enforcement of civil and commercial judgments (the
Brussels I Regulation)23 is applicable to cases involving cross-border
collective redress pursuant to the explicit terms of the Resolution.24
Although the Brussels I Regulation normally only applies when the
defendant is domiciled in a European Member State25, there are
times when a defendant domiciled outside the European Union will
be made subject to these provisions.26
Second, the Resolution suggests an imminent need for change in
the type of analysis that U.S. courts undertake in global class actions
23 See Council Regulation 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on Jurisdiction and the
Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, art.
5(3), 2001 O.J. (L 12) 1 (EC) [hereinafter Brussels I Regulation].
24 See Resolution, supra note 20, ¶¶ 26–27.
25 See Brussels I Regulation, supra note 23, ¶ 8, art. 6(1), Long-anticipated revisions to the Brussels I Regulation were formally approved by the Council of the European Union just as this Article was going to press and will go into effect on January 10,
2015. See Regulation (EU) No. 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement
of judgments in civil and commercial matters (recast), 2012 O.J. (L 351) 1 [hereinafter Brussels I Recast]. However, none of the revisions affect the current analysis.
26 See Case C-281/02, Owusu v. Jackson, 2005 E.C.R. I-1386, available at http://
curia.europa.eu/juris/showPdf.jsf?text=&docid=49758&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&
mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=2389349; S.I. Strong, Backyard Advantage: New
Rules Mean That U.S. Companies May Be Forced to Litigate Across the Pond, 28 LEGAL TIMES
43 (May 23, 2005) (noting a foreign defendant may be subject to the Brussels I Regulation if that party is one of several necessary defendants, where one of those defendants is domiciled in a European Member State). Notably, the revised version of the
Brussels I Regulation contemplates other instances in which the Regulation can affect
persons domiciled outside the European Union. See Brussels I Recast, supra note 25.
For example:
The recast regulation will provide that no national rules of jurisdiction may
be applied any longer by member states in relation to consumers and
employees domiciled outside the EU. Such uniform rules of jurisdiction will
also apply in relation to parties domiciled outside the EU in situations where
the courts of a member state have exclusive jurisdiction under the recast
regulation or where such courts have had jurisdiction conferred on them by
an agreement between the parties.
Another important change will be a rule on international lis pendens which
will allow the courts of a member state, on a discretionary basis, to stay the
proceedings and eventually dismiss the proceedings in situations where a
court of a third state has already been seized either of proceedings between
the same parties or of a related action at the time the EU court is seized.
Press Release, The Council of the European Union, Recast of the Brussels I regulation: towards easier and faster circulation of judgments in civil and commercial matters within the EU (6 Dec. 2012), 16599/12, PRESSE 483. This new lis pendens rule
could be particularly important in cases involving U.S. global class actions.
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involving European parties. At this point, most courts and commentators have focused on the problems that arise when U.S.-style regulatory litigation clashes with regulatory regimes that do not use
litigation as a regulatory device.27 However, the Resolution could be
construed as reflecting an intent by the European Union to adopt its
own form of regulatory litigation.28 If this is indeed the case, then
U.S. courts will have to undertake a new type of analysis that considers
not only whether and to what extent European forms of collective
relief (which will likely include significant procedural differences
from U.S. class actions) include a regulatory element, but how such
mechanisms measure up to U.S. forms of regulatory litigation.29
This will be a daunting task, particularly given that no analyses
have yet been conducted concerning the Resolution’s regulatory
potential.30 This suggests a significant need for a critical evaluation of
whether and to what extent the procedures proposed by the Resolution constitute a form of regulatory litigation.31
This Article intends to fill that critical gap and, in so doing,
achieve two basic objectives. First, this discussion aims to provide U.S.
courts with a better understanding of the ways in which various forms
of large-scale litigation operate as a regulatory mechanism in both the
United States and the European Union so as to help judges understand the issues at stake in global class actions. This analysis is valuable as a matter of both domestic and comparative law, since it will help
U.S. courts determine whether and to what extent they should allow
foreign parties to participate in a U.S. global class action.32
27 See Bermann, supra note 14, at 94; Buxbaum, Securities, supra note 10, at 35;
Choi & Silberman, supra note 14, at 465; Dixon, supra note 14, at 134; Monestier,
supra note 11, at 44–45; Mulheron, Vivendi, supra note 14, at 181–82; Rachael Mulheron, The Case for an Opt-Out Class Action for European Member States: A Legal and Empirical Analysis, 15 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 409, 426–27 (2009); Nagareda, supra note 10, at
11–12; Simard & Tidmarsh, supra note 14, at 89; Wasserman, supra note 11, at
335–69 (offering an overview of “salient differences” between the preclusion doctrines in Europe and the United States).
28 See Resolution, supra note 20; see also infra Part IV.A.
29 See supra note 17.
30 See Resolution, supra note 20. Some analyses of procedural issues are available.
See S.I. Strong, Cross-Border Collective Redress in the European Union: Constitutional Rights
in the Face of the Brussels I Regulation, 44 ARIZ. ST. L.J. (forthcoming 2013) [hereinafter
Strong, Brussels I].
31 See Resolution, supra note 20.
32 Although concerns regarding the international enforceability of a class award
may seem to relate only to the tail end of a dispute, the issue actually arises very early
on since many U.S. judges take future enforceability into account during certification
proceedings and will not allow an international class to go forward if the defendant
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Second, the Article aims to help European authorities consider
whether and to what extent the procedural mechanisms outlined in
the Resolution constitute a form of regulatory litigation.33 This is particularly important given the relative scarcity of discussion regarding
the regulatory impact of collective redress measures already adopted
by the various European Member States.34 In some ways, this phenomenon can be explained by the fact that European states tend to
justify large-scale litigation on efficiency and compensatory grounds
rather than regulatory rationales, possibly as a result of the traditional
European vision of regulation as arising solely as a result of legislative
or administrative action.35 However, the lack of emphasis on the regulatory nature of collective redress in European jurisprudence may
also be the result of a political desire to distance European forms of
cannot be assured that any resulting judgment will be given preclusive effect in other
jurisdictions. See Monestier, supra note 11, at 10–13.
33 See Resolution, supra note 20.
34 Virtually all existing commentary on the use of collective redress in Europe
focuses on procedural issues rather than regulatory concerns. See generally EXTRATERRITORIALITY AND COLLECTIVE REDRESS (Duncan Fairgrieve & Eva Lein eds., 2012); see
also Duncan Fairgrieve & Geraint Howells, Collective Redress Procedures—European
Debates, 58 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 379, 380 (2009); Christopher Hodges, Collective Redress
in Europe: The New Model, 29 CIV. JUST. Q. 370, 370 (2010) [hereinafter Hodges, Collective]; Christopher Hodges, What Are People Trying to Do in Resolving Mass Issues, How
Is It Going, and Where Are We Headed?, in THE ANNALS, supra note 15, at 330, 338 [hereinafter Hodges, Resolving]; Samuel Issacharoff & Geoffrey P. Miller, Will Aggregate
Litigation Come to Europe?, 62 VAND. L. REV. 177, 181 (2009); Rachael Mulheron, Recent
Milestones in Class Action Reform in England: A Critique and a Proposal, 127 L.Q. REV. 288,
289 (2011); Mulheron, Opt-Out, supra note 27, at 426–27; Laura Carballo Piñeiro,
Collective Redress in the Proposal for a Brussels I bis Regulation: A Coherent Approach?, 2
ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR EUROPÄISCHES UNTERNEHMENS- UND VERBRAUCHERRECHT – J. EUR.
CONSUMER & MARKET L. 81 (2012); Francesco Rizzuto, Does the European Community
Have Legal Competence to Harmonise National Procedural Rules Governing Private Actions for
Damages From Infringements of European Community Antitrust Rules?, 2 GLOBAL COMPETITION LITIG. REV. 29, 29–30 (2009); Tiana Leia Russell, Exporting Class Actions to the
European Union, 28 B.U. INT’L L.J. 141, 164–79 (2010); Edward F. Sherman, Group
Litigation Under Foreign Legal Systems: Variations and Alternatives to American Class Actions,
52 DEPAUL L. REV. 401 (2002); Strong, Brussels I, supra note 30; S.I. Strong, CrossBorder Collective Redress and Individual Participatory Rights: Quo Vadis? 32 CIV. JUST. Q.
__ (forthcoming 2013) [hereinafter Strong, Quo Vadis]; Gerhard Wagner, Collective
Redress—Categories of Loss and Legislative Options, 127 L.Q. REV. 55, 55 (2011).
35 See Coffee, supra note 2, at 345. However, this does not necessarily mean that
the procedures do not also include regulatory elements. See Directorate General,
supra note 19, at 38; MULHERON, supra note 9, at 63, 66; Bignami, supra note 5, at
441–59 (discussing regulatory styles of France, Germany, Britain, and Italy); Hodges,
Resolving, supra note 34, at 336–38; Christopher Hodges, Europeanization of Civil Justice: Trends and Issues, 26 CIV. JUST. Q. 96, 117–18, 121 (2007) [hereinafter Hodges,
Europeanization].
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collective redress from U.S. class actions, which are seen as contributing significantly to an abusive litigation culture.36
Although it may not be politically expedient within Europe to discuss the regulatory effect of collective redress, European authorities
nevertheless need to be aware of the impact such procedures may
have on national and regional regulatory regimes so that the procedures that are ultimately adopted achieve their desired objectives and
avoid upsetting the existing regulatory equilibrium.37 Since the European Commission and other European bodies have only just begun
the process of developing the procedures in question, recommendations on the current proposals are both timely and appropriate, since
there is still time for lawmakers to take the various suggestions into
account.38
The Article proceeds as follows. First, Part II puts the discussion
into context by considering the problems associated with transnational regulatory litigation as a matter of both procedural and regulatory law. Although this Part forms the foundation for later analysis,
the points made here are important in their own regard, since this
discussion demonstrates how global class actions interact with foreign
regulatory regimes and identifies various issues that U.S. courts must
take into account when deciding whether to allow a global class action
to proceed. This Part is also helpful to those looking at the matter
from the European perspective, since it demonstrates the role that
regulatory litigation plays in a world where “no formal political state

36 See Resolution, supra note 20, ¶ 2; see also Bignami, supra note 5, at 460;
Hodges, Europeanization, supra note 35, at 115; Valguarnera, supra note 19, at 3,
19–21.
37 Failure to recognize the regulatory effect of a particular procedure can lead to
unintended overdeterrence. See Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Gerrit De Geest, Carrots,
Sticks, and the Multiplication Effect, 26 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 365, 377 (2010); Russell, supra
note 34, at 151 n.47.
38 Creation of the new mechanism for cross-border collective redress will follow
the ordinary legislative procedure. See Resolution, supra note 20, ¶ 29; see also Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 294, Mar.
30, 2010, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 173 [hereinafter TFEU] (outlining the ordinary legislative
procedure, also known as the co-decision procedure). The European Commission is
scheduled to disclose its first proposed initiative in the fourth quarter of 2012. See
Annex to the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, at 20, Item 110,
COM (2011) 777 final (Nov. 15, 2011), available at http://ec.europa.eu/atwork/pdf/
cwp2012_annex_en.pdf; Commission Actions to be Adopted, 30/03/2012–31/12/
2012, Legislative Proposals, available at http://ec.europa.eu/atwork/programmes/
docs/forward_programming_2012.pdf.
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has authority of a scope commensurate with modern global
business.”39
Next, Part III introduces the concept of regulatory litigation per
se. This discussion identifies the role that the mechanism plays in the
United States and the European Union as a matter of institutional
design and describes those areas where regulatory litigation may be
most necessary. This Part adopts a functional analysis40 to help overcome various problems associated with comparing procedures on a
transatlantic basis and applies new governance theory41 as a means of
addressing certain differences of opinion regarding what regulation is
or should be.42
Part IV turns the focus to Europe and uses the information generated in Part III to evaluate whether and to what extent the Resolution
constitutes a form of regulatory litigation.43 This analysis focuses both
on the enunciated purposes of the Resolution as well as the preliminary procedures that have been proposed by the European Parlia39 Nagareda, supra note 10, at 13; see also Resolution, supra note 20, ¶¶ H, 19
(emphasizing the cross-border nature of the Resolution).
40 See Ralf Michaels, The Functional Method of Comparative Law, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW 339, 357 (Mathias Reiman & Reinhard Zimmerman
eds., 2006).
41 New governance theory attempts to identify new regulatory mechanisms that
fall between traditional command and control models of regulation and deregulated
markets. See On Amir & Orly Lobel, Stumble, Predict, Nudge: How Behavioral Economics
Informs Law and Policy, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 2098, 2100 (2008) (reviewing RICHARD H.
THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE (2008) and DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL
(2008)); see also R. DANIEL KELEMEN, EUROLEGALISM (2011); DANIEL YERGIN & JOSEPH
STANISLAW, THE COMMANDING HEIGHTS (1998); Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal,
Strengthening International Regulation Through Transnational New Governance: Overcoming
the Orchestration Deficit, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 501 (2009); Francesca Bignami,
From Expert Administration to Accountability Network: A New Paradigm for Comparative
Administrative Law, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 859, 872–73 (2011); Michael C. Dorf & Charles
F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998);
Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Minimalism and Experimentalism in the Administrative State, 100 GEO. L.J. 53, 54 (2011); Scott, supra note 1, at 652.
42 New governance theory supplies a new critical perspective on questions of institutional design. See IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION 3 (1992)
(“Good policy analysis is not about choosing between the free market and government regulation. . . . [S]ound policy analysis is about understanding private regulation . . . and how it is interdependent with state regulation . . . .”); Michael C. Dorf,
Legal Indeterminacy and Institutional Design, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 875, 882 (2003) (suggesting “the way past the current impasse is to return to [a] commitment to a legal
decisionmaking process that is deeply informed about the institutions with which
legal actors interact”).
43 See Resolution, supra note 20.
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ment.44 This Part also takes the discussion in a more normative
direction by applying dispute system design theory to consider which
procedures would be best suited to achieve the regulatory and other
aims outlined in the Resolution.45 Finally, Part V pulls the various
strands of analysis together and provides some concluding observations for both U.S. and European audiences.
Before beginning, it is helpful to make several preliminary points.
First, this Article does not attempt to determine whether regulatory
litigation is objectively “better” than traditional forms of regulation.
While such analyses are useful, there is extensive literature on this
matter already.46
Second, this Article focuses only on certain European-level measures—that is, the Resolution—and not on procedures that exist at
the individual Member State level.47 Although it would be interesting
to consider the extent to which different Members States’ laws on collective redress reflect a regulatory purpose, as a practical matter, U.S.
courts will be more concerned with the Resolution and subsequent
European legislation, since those are the measures that will be most
relevant to cross-border disputes involving U.S. parties.48
Third, it is helpful to introduce what is meant by “collective
redress” in the European context. The term is often used as a means
of distinguishing certain forms of large-scale relief from “class
actions,” which is the phrase used to refer to procedural mechanisms
that incorporate most, if not all, of the traits of the U.S. class action.49
44 See id.
45 See Susan D. Franck, Integrating Investment Treaty Conflict and Dispute Systems
Design, 92 MINN. L. REV. 161, 177–78 (2007) (noting dispute systems design “is not a
dispute resolution methodology itself” but instead reflects “the intentional and systematic creation of an effective, efficient, and fair dispute resolution process based
upon the unique needs of a particular system”).
46 See ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM 9 (2001); KELEMEN, supra note 41;
ANDREW P. MORRISS ET AL., REGULATION BY LITIGATION 171 (2009) (concluding that
“regulation by litigation is [not] appropriate”); REGULATION THROUGH LITIGATION
(W. Kip Viscusi ed.) (2002); Gillian K. Hadfield, Don’t Forget the Lawyers: The Role of
Lawyers in Promoting the Rule of Law in Emerging Market Democracies, 56 DEPAUL L. REV.
401, 401, 405 (2007); Samuel Issacharoff, Regulating After the Fact, 56 DEPAUL L. REV.
375, 377 (2007); Andrew P. Morriss et al., Regulation by Litigation, 9 ENGAGE: J. FEDERALIST SOC’Y PRAC. GROUPS 109 (2008); William B. Rubenstein, Why Enable Litigation? A
Positive Externalities Theory of the Small Claims Class Action, 74 UMKC L. REV. 709, 710
(2006).
47 See Resolution, supra note 20.
48 See id.; supra notes 23–26 and accompanying text.
49 See Hensler, supra note 15, at 13; Hodges, Resolving, supra note 34, at 338; see
also supra note 17. Interestingly, U.S. courts have begun to identify differences
between class and collective procedures. See Velez v. Perrin Holder & Davenport Cap-
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Several different definitions of collective redress currently exist within
the European Union. For example, in a public consultation undertaken in 2011 regarding the possibility of a European approach to
cross-border collective redress, the European Commission defined the
term as reflecting:
a broad concept encompassing any mechanism that may accomplish
the cessation or prevention of unlawful business practices which
affect a multitude of claimants or the compensation for the harm
caused by such practices. There are two main forms of collective
redress [in the European Union]: by way of injunctive relief, claimants seek to stop the continuation of illegal behaviour; by way of
compensatory relief, they seek damages for the harm caused.50

A more detailed definition was used by the European Commission in a draft revision to the Brussels I Regulation, although that language was ultimately not adopted.51 This provision defined collective
redress as involving:
proceedings which concern the compensation of harm caused by
unlawful business practices to a multitude of injured persons and
which are brought by
i. a state body
ii. a non-profit making organisation whose main purpose and activity is to represent and defend the interests of groups of natural or
legal persons, other than by, on a commercial basis, providing them
with legal advice or representing them in court, or
iii. a group of more than twelve claimants.52

Individual Member States may also define the term as a matter of
national law.53 However, there is no need to identify one particular
definition as superior to the others, at least for purposes of this Article. Instead, it is sufficient to recognize that procedures relating to
collective redress under European and individual Member State law
are significantly different from procedures used in U.S. class actions.54
ital Corp., 769 F. Supp. 2d 445, 446–47 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); JetBlue Airways Corp. v. Stephenson, 931 N.Y.S.2d 284, 288–89 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011).
50 Public Consultation, supra note 21, ¶ 7.
51 See Brussels I Regulation, supra note 23; see also supra note 25.
52 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Jurisdiction
and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (Recast),
art. 37(3)(b) (as amended) COM (2010) 748 final (Dec. 14, 2010). The Council of
the European Union approved the final revisions to the Brussels I Regulation just as
this Article was going to press, and this definition was not included in the final
approved draft. See Brussels I Recast, supra note 25.
53 See Directorate General, supra note 19, at 38.
54 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
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However, it is important to understand the extent of those differences
at least as a general concern, since they can contribute to the procedural and “regulatory mismatches” that arise in cases involving transnational regulatory litigation, a subject that is taken up in the next
Part.55
II.

ISSUES RELATING

TO

TRANSNATIONAL REGULATORY LITIGATION

Globalization has led to an ever-increasing number of large-scale
legal injuries that include a cross-border element.56 Given the
amount of trade that occurs between the United States and the European Union, controversies involving U.S. and European parties may
be among the most frequent to arise.57 However, mass disputes are
also becoming increasingly common at an intra-European level, with a
2008 study estimating that ten percent of the collective redress cases
involving the then-thirteen Member States with collective redress
mechanisms were cross-border in nature.58 That number was estimated to be as high as forty percent if the calculation included collective injuries in Member States without domestic forms of collective
redress.59
The increasing volume of cross-border collective injuries was one
reason behind the European Parliament’s decision to adopt the Resolution.60 However, European authorities were also concerned about
the effectiveness of existing procedures providing for collective
redress, particularly in cases involving intra-European disputes.61
55 See Nagareda, supra note 10, at 13.
56 See Hensler, Future, supra note 14, at 250–55.
57 The economic relationship between the European Union and the United
States is the largest in the world, with trade flows of approximately $3.6 billion a day.
See European Union, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, http://
www.ustr.gov/countries-regions/europe-middle-east/europe/european-union (last
visited Sept. 19, 2012) (citing figures from 2010).
58 See Directorate General, supra note 19, at 43.
59 See id.
60 See Resolution, supra note 20, ¶ H.
61 Id. ¶ G (noting “in some Member States the overall performance of the
existing consumer redress and enforcement tools designed at EU level is not deemed
satisfactory, or such mechanisms are not sufficiently well known, which results in their
limited use”). Commentators have also found large scale litigation to be problematic
on an intra-European basis. See Peter Barnett, The Prevention of Abusive Cross-Border ReLitigation, 51 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 943, 957 (2002); Fairgrieve & Howells, supra note
34, at 380; Hodges, Collective, supra note 34, at 370; Mulheron, Opt-Out, supra note
27, at 426–27; Rizzuto, supra note 34, at 29–30; Strong, Brussels I, supra note 30;
Strong, Quo Vadis, supra note 34.
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Europeans are not the only ones to notice the difficulties associated with resolving international large-scale disputes. A number of
North American and international organizations have also been working on these issues, primarily through the promulgation of non-binding procedural protocols meant to assist courts with the coordination
of parallel actions.62 Numerous commentators have also considered
these issues.63
Although existing analyses and protocols are helpful in their own
way, they are at best a partial answer to the problem, since they focus
almost entirely on procedural concerns.64 The real challenge—both
practically and jurisprudentially—arises as a matter of regulatory
law.65
The difficulty here is that while traditional means of regulation
do exist in the international realm, such efforts are often incomplete
or ineffective, due to the absence of a single political entity with comprehensive authority over the wrongful behavior and associated legal
injuries.66 International regulatory agencies, to the extent they
exist,67 typically operate only on a sectoral basis and do not (or can62

See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, ABA PROTOCOL ON COURT-TO-COURT COMMUCANADA-U.S. CROSS-BORDER CLASS ACTIONS & ABA NOTICE PROTOCOL:
COORDINATING NOTICE(S) TO THE CLASS(ES) IN MULTIJURISDICTIONAL CLASS PROCEEDINGS (2011), available at http://www.cba.org/cba/resolutions/pdf/11-03-A-bckd.pdf;
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE & INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCY INSTITUTE, GUIDELINES APPLICABLE TO COURT-TO-COURT COMMUNICATIONS IN CROSS-BORDER CASES (2003), available
at http://www.courts.gov.bc.ca/supreme_court/practice_and_procedure/practice_
directions_and_notices/General/Guidelines%20Cross-Border%20Cases.pdf; AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION (2010); CANADIAN BAR ASSOCIATION, CONSULTATION PAPER: CANADIAN JUDICIAL PROTOCOL FOR THE
MANAGEMENT OF MULTIJURISDICTIONAL CLASS ACTIONS (2011); INTERNATIONAL BAR
ASSOCIATION, GUIDELINES FOR RECOGNISING AND ENFORCING FOREIGN JUDGMENTS FOR
COLLECTIVE REDRESS (2008), available at http://www.ibanet.org/Search/Default.aspx?
q=guidelines%20for%20Recognising%20and%20enforcing; see also Betsy M.
Adeboyejo, Protocols for Cross-Border Cases . . . Will They Work?, ABA NOW (Aug. 6, 2011),
http://www.abanow.org/2011/08/protocols-for-cross-border-cases-%E2%80%A6-willthey-work/.
63 See Bermann, supra note 14, at 94; Buxbaum, Securities, supra note 10, at 35;
Choi & Silberman, supra note 14, at 465; Dixon, supra note 14, at 134; Mulheron,
Vivendi, supra note 14, at 181–82; Mulheron, Opt-Out, supra note 27, at 426–27;
Nagareda, supra note 10, at 11–12; Stiggelbout, supra note 14, at 433.
64 See supra notes 62–63 and accompanying text.
65 See Buxbaum, Securities, supra note 10, at 52–56; Buxbaum, Transnational,
supra note 10, at 257–72; Nagareda, supra note 10, at 14–41.
66 See Nagareda, supra note 10, at 13; Richard B. Stewart, The Global Regulatory
Challenge to U.S. Administrative Law, 37 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 695, 699–703 (2005).
67 These regulatory bodies typically must be set up by international agreement,
since no state has worldwide authority over regulatory concerns. See Nagareda, supra
NICATIONS IN
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not) always provide an efficient, predictable, and legally enforceable
means of regulating the relevant behavior.68 Formal regulatory bodies also find it difficult to respond rapidly to threats of international
legal harm, even though the pace and integrated nature of modern
globalized society means that developments in one jurisdiction can
have a nearly instantaneous effect elsewhere in the world.69
The absence of formal means of regulation has led to the development, in some cases, of transnational regulatory litigation, which
results when various public and private actors “regulate social harm”70
on an international basis by “us[ing] litigation and the courts to
achieve and apply regulatory outcomes to entire industries.”71 For
years, the United States has been seen as the leader in transnational
regulatory litigation due to its willingness and ability to allow global
class actions.72 However, as the U.S. experience shows, using litigation as a transnational regulatory mechanism can be highly
problematic.73
For example, some of the institutional design concerns that are
often raised regarding regulatory litigation in the national sphere can
be used to oppose transnational regulatory litigation as well.74 These
issues would involve questions relating to whether private litigation
note 10, at 13; see also Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, 8 U.S.T.
1093, 276 U.N.T.S. 3 (1956), available at http://www.iaea.org/About/statute.html#
A1.1 (acting as worldwide regulator of matters relating to nuclear energy).
68 See Stewart, supra note 66, at 703 (describing international regulation as involving “a web of interactions and influences, horizontal, vertical, and diagonal, among a
diverse multiplicity of different regimes and actors, resembling nothing so much as a
Jackson Pollock painting”); see also Benedict Kingsbury & Stephan W. Schill, InvestorState Arbitration as Governance: Fair and Equitable Treatment, Proportionality and the Emerging Global Administrative Law, in 50 YEARS OF THE NEW YORK CONVENTION, 14 ICCA
CONG. SER. 10–11 (Albert Jan van den Berg ed., 2008).
69 See Sungjoon Cho & Claire R. Kelly, Promises and Perils of New Global Governance:
A Case of the G20, 12 CHI. J. INT’L. L. 491, 494 (2012) (noting “international regulations, if any, may not come as quickly as the urgency of the problems would
demand”); Richard N. Gardner, The Bretton Woods-GATT System After Sixty-Five Years: A
Balance Sheet of Success and Failure, 47 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 31, 43 (2008).
70 Glover, supra note 2, at 1146.
71 Luff, supra note 8, at 96 (quoting ANDREW P. MORISS ET AL., REGULATION BY
LITIGATION 1 (2009)); see also Buxbaum, Transnational, supra note 10, at 252–53.
72 See Jodie A. Kirschner, Why is the U.S. Abdicating the Policing of Multinational
Corporations to Europe?: Extraterritorialism, Sovereignty, and the Alien Tort Statute, 29 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. (forthcoming 2012); Marco Ventoruzzo, Like Moths to a Flame? International Securities Litigation After Morrison: Correcting the Supreme Court’s “Transactional
Test,” 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 405, 405 (2012).
73 See Buxbaum, Securities, supra note 10, at 52–56; Buxbaum, Transnational,
supra note 10, at 252–53, 257–72; Nagareda, supra note 10, at 14–41.
74 See Coffee, supra note 2, at 345.
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constitutes an appropriate means of enforcing public laws and
whether regulatory silence should be construed as an unintended gap
or a conscious policy decision on the part of the relevant political
actors.75 These issues are not discussed in detail in this Article, since
they are adequately addressed in the literature concerning regulatory
litigation in the domestic realm.76
Other problems arise as a matter of civil procedure.77 For example, it can be hard to identify a court with jurisdiction over all interested persons, obtain extraterritorial application of domestic laws,
and/or achieve international enforcement of judgments.78 Cases
involving class or collective relief often experience additional difficulties, since the forum state’s approach to large-scale litigation may not
be the same as that taken in other relevant jurisdictions, thus creating
a procedural mismatch.79 Parties seeking to assert multinational class
actions in the United States have experienced significant problems as
a result of U.S. courts’ standard use of opt-out mechanisms, since
some countries view opt-out procedures as constitutionally suspect
and will not enforce a judgment if a plaintiff did not affirmatively opt
into the lawsuit.80
While many of these procedural issues exist in any type of international litigation, they are exacerbated in regulatory litigation, since
different states often have different views about the propriety of using
litigation as a means of regulation.81 Courts have traditionally tried to
avoid difficulties in this regard by “consider[ing] markets separately,
and view[ing] their role as protecting conditions only within” their
75 See id.
76 See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
77 Interestingly, this appears to be the most common analytical paradigm for
issues relating to transnational regulatory litigation. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
78 See Buxbaum, Securities, supra note 10, at 18–67; Buxbaum, Transnational,
supra note 10, at 272–93; Kirschner, supra note 72; Nagareda, supra note 10, at 19–41;
S.I. Strong, Mass Torts and Arbitration: Lessons From Abaclat v. Argentine Republic, in
UNCERTAINTY AND MASS TORT: CAUSATION AND PROOF (José Ferrer Beltrán et al. eds.)
(forthcoming 2013) [hereinafter Strong, Mass Torts]; Ventoruzzo, supra note 72, at
443.
79 See supra note 14. However, difficulties can arise even when procedures in the
two countries are similar. See S.I. Strong, Resolving Mass Legal Disputes Through Class
Arbitration: The United States and Canada Compared, 37 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 921,
926–27 (2012) [hereinafter Strong, Canada].
80 See In re Vivendi Universal, No. 02 Civ. 5571, 2009 WL 855799, at *3 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 31, 2009); Monestier, supra note 11, at 44–45; Mulheron, Opt-Out, supra note
27, at 426–27.
81 See Buxbaum, Transnational, supra note 10, at 297–305.
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own jurisdiction,82 consistent with longstanding jurisprudential principles about the power of the territorial state.83 However, a highly balkanized approach can be troublesome in a contemporary legal
environment that includes highly integrated global markets and internationally fluid societies.84 Therefore, it has been suggested that
“where the economic markets for particular products are not separable along geographic lines, regulatory efforts too must be directed at a
more broadly defined market.”85
Use of a highly territorial approach to regulation in cases of
global injuries can affect both individuals and society as a whole.86
For example, the failure to coordinate regulation across national
boundaries in cases of multinational harm can lead to regulatory gaps
(which leads to under-deterrence of the harmful behavior),87 regulatory duplication (which leads to over-deterrence of what could
include socially beneficial behavior)88 and regulatory inconsistency
82 Id. at 282; see also Nagareda, supra note 10, at 37; Stewart, supra note 66, at 697.
As the Second Circuit stated recently:
[F]oreign companies are creatures of other states. They are subject to corporate governance and government regulation at home. They are often
engines of their national economies, sustaining employees, pensioners and
creditors—and paying taxes. . . . American courts and lawyers [do not] have
the power to bring to court transnational corporations of other countries, to
inquire into their operations in third countries, to regulate them—and to
beggar them by rendering their assets into compensatory damages, punitive
damages, and (American) legal fees.
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 642 F.3d 268, 270 (2d Cir. 2011) (discussing
claims under the Alien Tort Claims Act).
83 See Anne Orford, Jurisdiction Without Territory: From Holy Roman Empire to the
Responsibility to Protect, 30 MICH. J. INT’L L. 981, 981–82, 1013 (2009) (noting that
these views arose in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries).
84 See Nagareda, supra note 10, at 37; see also Hensler, Future, supra note 14, at
250–55.
85 Buxbaum, Transnational, supra note 10, at 260; see also id. at 297–305;
Nagareda, supra note 10, at 13.
86 See Alberto Cassone & Giovanni B. Ramello, The Simple Economics of Class Action:
Private Provision of Club and Public Goods, 32 EUR. J. L. & ECON. 205, 209–12, 222–23
(2011); Giovanni B. Ramello, Aggregate Litigation and Regulatory Innovation: Another
View of Judicial Efficiency, 32 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 63, 64 (2012).
87 This scenario may be most readily seen in the context of antitrust or competition law, in that developing countries without robust antitrust or competition law
regimes “may leave anti-competitive conduct entirely unregulated,” thus requiring
other countries to step in so as to “ensure better regulation of markets everywhere.”
Buxbaum, Transnational, supra note 10, at 261. However, problems with comparative
under-regulation can also arise in other fields, such as those involving securities,
pharmaceuticals, or the environment. See id.
88 See Russell, supra note 34, at 151 n.47.
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(which leads to parties being made subject to different obligations
under multiple applicable standards).89
However, deciding to engage in regulatory litigation on a transnational basis gives rise to its own set of difficulties. For example, courts
attempting to address a global regulatory injury can experience
problems with respect to the substantive law used to resolve the dispute.90 In contrast to “[t]ransnational public law litigation,” which
“takes place in the domestic courts of a particular country” and
applies “international law norms,”91 transnational regulatory litigation
typically involves domestic courts applying domestic regulatory law
“for the benefit of the international community.”92 This can create
considerable tension on the foreign relations front,93 since the laws in
question often involve politically sensitive issues such as those relating
to economic policy.94
Other problems arise because some state courts are loathe to
relinquish jurisdiction over their own citizens in cases where “the
mandatory and regulatory nature” of certain laws give rise to a “particularly strong” national interest in enforcing those laws domestically.95
Not only can these concerns lead some courts to refuse to relinquish
89 See Buxbaum, Transnational, supra note 10, at 261; Alan Devlin & Michael
Jacobs, Antitrust Divergence and the Limits of Economics, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 253, 267–68
(2010) (discussing inconsistent actions taken by the U.S. Department of Justice and
the European Commission with respect to Microsoft, as well as the proposed merger
between Honeywell and General Electric); see also William E. Kovacic, The Institutions
of Antitrust Law: How Structure Shapes Substance, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1019, 1036 n.67
(2012) (discussing three transatlantic scrapes between the U.S. Department of Justice
and European entities.); Stewart, supra note 66, at 695 (“[T]he past twenty-five years
have witnessed a dramatic shift of regulatory authority from the nation state to a dizzying variety of global regulatory regimes, including international organizations, transnational networks of national regulatory officials, and private or hybrid private-public
regulatory bodies.”).
90 See Buxbaum, Transnational, supra note 10, at 254–57.
91 Id. at 257; see also id. at 254–55.
92 Id. at 254.
93 See Buxbaum, Securities, supra note 10, at 63–64 (noting “concerns that an
expansive assertion of jurisdiction by [one nation’s] courts plays in other countries as
an instrument of regulatory hegemony”); see also Buxbaum, Transnational, supra note
10, at 270.
94 See Buxbaum, Transnational, supra note 10, at 255 (citing examples under U.S.
antitrust law, securities law, and the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO)). This is assuming that the forum state can find a means of applying
national law extraterritorially. National legislatures typically do not intend their laws
to have extraterritorial effect, particularly in the politically sensitive realm of regulatory law. See id. at 268; see also Ventoruzzo, supra note 72, at 436.
95 See Buxbaum, Securities, supra note 10, at 37; see also Kirschner, supra note 72.
For example, U.S. courts may be disinclined to decline jurisdiction on grounds of
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jurisdiction over their own nationals, but some judges may decline
jurisdiction over foreign nationals as an exercise of comity.96
Although it is technically possible for courts to address substantive
issues by applying different national laws to different subgroups of
parties, that process can become so complicated as to destroy the
superiority of the class mechanism over other means of resolving the
dispute.97
Up until this point, most of the practical and academic debate
regarding transnational regulatory litigation has focused on problems
associated with global class actions filed in U.S. courts.98 However, the
expansion and diversification of large-scale litigation around the
world99 means that an ever-increasing number of jurisdictions are now
amenable to taking on the challenges associated with transnational
regulatory litigation.100 Thus, for example, the Canadian case of Silver
v. Imax Corp.101 was heralded as making “Ontario a new haven for secondary market class actions”102 after the U.S. Supreme Court curtailed
plaintiffs’ ability to bring “foreign-cubed” securities actions in the
United States in Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd.103 The
Netherlands has also been touted as being capable of addressing “foreign-cubed” securities actions as well as other global regulatory concerns as a result of the Dutch Act on Collective Settlements of 2005,

forum non conveniens in cases where “the claims of U.S. nationals . . . strongly implicate
local regulatory interests.” Buxbaum, Securities, supra note 10, at 38.
96 See Bermann, supra note 14, at 94; Monestier, supra note 11, at 71.
97 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3); Buxbaum, Securities, supra note 10, at 66–67.
98 See Bermann, supra note 14, at 93; Buxbaum, Securities, supra note 10, at 35;
Choi & Silberman, supra note 14, at 465; Dixon, supra note 14, at 134; Monestier,
supra note 11, at 44–45; Mulheron, Vivendi, supra note 14, at 181–82; Nagareda, supra
note 10, at 11–12; Wasserman, supra note 11, at 331–69.
99 See The ANNALS, supra note 15 (discussing thirty different national regimes).
100 Some commentators have suggested that the European Union and its individual Member States may be replacing the United States as the leading jurisdiction to
police the wrongdoing of multinational actors. See Kirschner, supra note 72.
101 Silver v. Imax Corp., [2009] O.J. No. 5573 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.); Silver v.
Imax Corp., [2009] O.J. No. 5585 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.).
102 Mark Gelowitz, Court Certifies Class Action Against Imax: Liability May be Coming
Soon to a Theatre Near You, LAW. WKLY., Feb. 19, 2010, http://www.lawyersweekly.ca/
index.php?section=article&articleid=1103 (last visited Sept. 29, 2012); see also Silver,
[2009] O.J. No. 5573; Silver, [2009] O.J. No. 5585; Monestier, supra note 11, at 75
n.260; Strong, Canada, supra note 79, at 927.
103 See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2894 n.11 (2010) (Stevens, J. concurring) (defining “foreign-cubed” actions).
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which allows the creation of world-wide classes on an opt-out basis,
albeit for settlement purposes only.104
As the first public entity to address the numerous challenges associated with cross-border collective redress, the European Union has
taken on a daunting task, even if the focus is only on procedural matters.105 However, the Resolution and attendant future legislation may
also provide solutions and insights into certain issues relating to transnational regulatory litigation within the European Union106 and with
other countries, including the United States.107 Further details
regarding the Resolution are discussed below.108 First, however, it is
necessary to analyze the concept of regulatory litigation more thoroughly. This subject is addressed in the next Part.109
III.

REGULATION, LITIGATION,

AND

REGULATORY LITIGATION

A. Methodological Issues
Because regulatory litigation defines itself primarily on an operational level, it is impossible to identify the form, effect, or purpose of
the device simply by consulting a particular statute or procedural
104 See Arjan de Boode & Allard Huizing, The Netherlands as an Alternative Forum for
Cross Border Class Settlements and the Potential Consequences for Claims by “Foreign Cubed”
Plaintiffs under U.S. Securities Laws, GREENBURG TRAURIG ALERT (Jan. 2010), http://
www.gtlaw.com/News-Events/Publications/Alerts/132898/The-Netherlands-as-anAlternative-Forum-for-Cross-Border-Class-Settlements-and-the-Potential-Consequences-for-Claims-by-Foreign-Cubed-Plaintiffs-under-US-Securities-Laws (last visited
Sept. 28, 2012); Ianika Tzankova & Daan Lunsigh Scheurleer, The Netherlands, in The
ANNALS, supra note 15, at 149, 153–55. The Amsterdam Court of Appeal has recently
confirmed a settlement involving a pan-European class. See Hof’s-Amsterdam 17
Januari 2012, (Scor Holding (Switz.) AG/Liechtensteinische Landesbank AG)
(Neth.), English translation available at http://www.converiumsettlement.com/
images/stories/documents/Decision%2017%20January%202012.pdf. (often referring to the settlement itself as SCOR Holding (Switzerland) AG/Zurich Fin. Serv. Ltd.
Stichting Converium Sec. Compensation Found./Vereniging (VEBNCVB)).
105 See Resolution, supra note 20. Some private organizations have attempted to
address this issue. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
106 See Resolution, supra note 20; see also infra notes 323–80 and accompanying
text. Because the European Union has the political power to regulate certain matters
within the European Union, the Resolution may be unique in the world of transnational regulatory litigation. See TFEU, supra note 38, arts. 3, 5 (noting one area of
European competence involves the operation of the internal market); Resolution,
supra note 20, ¶¶ M, 4, 6, 8.
107 See supra notes 23–26 and accompanying text.
108 See Resolution, supra note 20; see also infra notes 323–80 and accompanying
text.
109 See infra Part III.
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rule.110 Instead, regulatory litigation invokes complex questions of
institutional design, not only between different public institutions but
also between public and private actors.111 This can make analysis difficult, both within and between the United States and the European
Union, since the two legal systems have traditionally perceived regulation as being carried out through very different institutional means.112
The situation is further complicated by the fact that class actions—
which constitute the paradigmatic form of regulatory litigation—do
not act exclusively as regulatory devices, but instead fulfill various
other functions, including those relating to compensation and efficiency, in varying degrees and possibly even to the exclusion of any
regulatory purpose.113
Commentators exploring the possible “Americanization” of European law have noted the importance of “gather[ing] data on how the
law is being used on the ground” before coming to any conclusions
about the convergence of any particular regulatory mechanisms.114
This focus on the law “on the ground” suggests the propriety of a
functional methodology that recognizes not only that “similar institutions can fulfil different functions in different societies or at different
times,” but also that “similar functional needs can be fulfilled by different institutions.”115 Since regulatory litigation challenges a number of formalist assumptions, such as those regarding “regulation” as
an exclusively legislative or “public” activity, functionalism appears to
be a particularly appropriate research methodology for this Article.116
110 However, regulatory litigation is reflected in a number of statutes and rules, as
well as various common law principles. See Buxbaum, Transnational, supra note 10, at
256.
111 See Coffee, supra note 2, at 350; Dorf, supra note 42, at 879–80; Glover, supra
note 2, at 1146.
112 See Coffee, supra note 2, at 344–45.
113 See Michael M. Karayanni, A Model Typology for Class Actions: Lessons From Israel,
in Cross Border Class Actions, Brussels, Belgium, 27 April 2012; see also DEBORAH R.
HENSLER ET AL., CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS 121–22 (2000); MULHERON, supra note 9, at
63, 66 (explaining the different objectives of different nations’ class action regimes);
Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Securities Class Actions as Pragmatic Ex Post Regulation, 43
GA. L. REV. 63, 74–76 (2008) (arguing that private enforcement is a cost-effective way
to protect public rights).
114 Bignami, supra note 5, at 460 (“This empirical work is equally or more likely to
find institutional resistance to change as it is to find Americanization.”).
115 Michaels, supra note 40, at 357 (discussing equivalence functionalism); see also
Victoria Nourse & Gregory Shaffer, Varieties of New Legal Realism: Can a New World
Order Prompt a New Legal Theory?, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 61, 74–76 (2009); Mark Tushnet,
The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law, 108 YALE L.J. 1225, 1228–29 (1999).
116 See supra notes 41–42 and accompanying text.
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Functionalism also “overcomes the epistemic/doctrinal difference between civil and common law by declaring it functionally irrelevant”117 and considers how different legal systems solve the same
functional concerns. Given that the current study requires analysis
across the common law-civil law divide, functionalism appears to constitute a highly suitable methodological approach. A functionalist
methodology includes three distinct attributes:118
First, functionalist comparative law is factual, it focuses not on rules
but on their effects, not on doctrinal structures and argument, but
on events. As a consequence . . . legal systems are compared by
considering their various judicial [and legislative] responses to similar situations. Second, functionalist comparative law combines its
factual approach with the theory that its objects must be understood
in the light of their functional relation to society. . . . Consequently,
and third, function itself serves as tertium comparationis. Institutions,
both legal and non-legal, even doctrinally different ones, are comparable if they are functionally equivalent, if they fulfil similar functions in different legal systems.119

Consistent with the preceding, the current inquiry will adopt a
needs-based analysis to identify what a legal system needs to operate
effectively and efficiently within its own regulatory sphere.120 This
approach will be used not only as a means of considering whether the
European Union has developed a form of regulatory litigation that is
comparable to that used in the United States but also as a means of
defining what regulatory litigation is.
B. Regulatory Litigation as a Function of Need
1. Litigation as a Necessary Form of Regulation
a. Litigation as a form of regulation
“In order to understand what regulatory litigation is, it is necessary first to understand how it functions—as a stopgap that acts to
protect individual citizens from risk.”121 If risk reflects the functional
touchstone for regulation, then “courts become regulatory instruments” to the extent “that they are essential to the operation of . . .
risk regulation.”122
117 Michaels, supra note 40, at 357; see also id. at 342.
118 See id. at 342.
119 Id.
120 It may be that regulatory litigation is particularly appropriate in cases involving
cross-border legal injuries. See supra notes 56–73 and accompanying text.
121 Luff, supra note 8, at 114.
122 Id. at 113.
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The concept of courts acting in a regulatory fashion may seem
unobjectionable to many U.S. trained lawyers, since the notion of litigation as regulation is so deeply embedded in the American legal
psyche.123 However, framing litigation as a risk regulator flies in the
face of the “received tradition,” common in many European jurisdictions, that “the lawsuit is a vehicle for settling disputes between private
parties about private rights.”124 Under this more formalist command
and control model, regulation is a function of public law and can
therefore only be generated by democratically accountable branches
of government.125
The “Continental tendency to sharply divide public and private
law” can be explained as “the result of the hierarchical organization of
power” common in many European jurisdictions.126 In these legal systems, “each section of bureaucracy tends to specialize in a certain field
and jealously defend its prerogatives.”127 Conflicts can appear not
only at the inter-agency level but also at the institutional level, leading
the various branches of government to defend their spheres of influence from incursions brought by other institutional actors.128
The situation is very different in the United States. Because the
U.S. system reflects a horizontal rather than hierarchical power structure,129 American courts and commentators do not distinguish
between public and private law in quite the same way that European
authorities do.130 Instead, regulatory responsibility is often shared
between different institutional actors.131 Thus, in the United States:
123 See id. at 80; see also MORRISS ET AL., supra note 46, passim; viscusi, supra note 46,
passim.
124 Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV.
1281, 1282 (1976); see also Jack Greenberg, Civil Rights Class Actions: Procedural Means
of Obtaining Substance, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 575, 576–77 (1997) (explaining the regulatory
role of the courts); Luff, supra note 8, at 101 (analyzing theories of regulatory
litigation).
125 This view is not limited to Europe. See Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Reforming Public Interest Tort Law to Redress Public Health Epidemics, 14 J. HEALTH
CARE L. & POL’Y 331, 368 (2011).
126 Valguarnera, supra note 19, at 19 (discussing MIRJAN DAMAS̆KA, THE FACES OF
JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY (1986)).
127 Valguarnera, supra note 19, at 19.
128 See id.
129 See id. at 3; see also Jason Marisam, The Interagency Marketplace, 96 MINN. L. REV.
886, 886 (2012) (“Federal agencies routinely contract with each other to exchange
money, regulatory power, and governmental services.”).
130 See Ronald A. Brand, Private Law and Public Regulation in U.S. Courts, in 2
CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL LEGAL EDUCATION (CILE) STUDIES 115, 115 (2005).
131 See id.
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The label of “regulation” can be applied to a wide spectrum of governmental and private activity. Definitions of regulation in the
wider field of regulatory theory have spanned the gamut from statesponsored efforts to command and control individual behavior
through the use of targeted rules to any form of social control,
regardless of the actors involved. . . . [Hence,] “it has become
widely accepted that regulation can be carried out by numerous
mechanisms other than those commonly typified as ‘command and
control.’”132

While this regulatory approach has traditionally been associated
with the United States, other jurisdictions are now beginning to consider the potential merits of the kind of shared public-private model
of regulation that is advocated by new governance theorists.133
Indeed, command and control models of regulation are becoming
increasingly disfavored, not only in the United States, but in Europe
as well.134 Thus, while “some commentators are uncomfortable with
the idea of ‘selfish’ individual interests being used as an instrument
for promoting collective welfare,” some European analysts are beginning to recognize that class and collective relief “has the potential to
recreate, in the judicial domain, the same effects that individual interests and motivations, governed by the perfect competition paradigm,
bring to the market.”135 Of course, it remains to be seen whether the
Resolution brings this new theoretical approach into practice.136
b. Bottom-up and Top-down Regulatory Litigation
Once regulatory litigation has been framed as a means of addressing risk, it is possible to distinguish between various types of risk.137
132 Luff, supra note 8, at 89–90 (citations omitted).
133 For example:
When faced with gaps and ambiguities in the law, judges need not simply
choose between the Scylla of deference and the Charybdis of usurpation.
Trial courts can address some broad social problems without directly taking
over responsibility for running institutions like prisons, schools, and police
forces, while appellate courts need not themselves fill the gaps in constitutional and other open-ended legal norms; they can instead (or at least additionally) instigate reform by other actors.
Dorf, supra note 42, at 882–83; see also supra notes 41–42 and accompanying text.
134 See Bignami, supra note 5, at 418; Hodges, ANNALS, supra note 20, at 336–38;
Sabel & Simon, supra note 41, at 54.
135 Cassone & Ramello, supra note 86, at 223.
136 See infra notes 347–80 and accompanying text.
137 See Luff, supra note 8, at 113–14. Regulatory litigation can also be seen as a
means of addressing other types of market distortions, although those issues are
beyond the scope of this Article. See Hodges, ANNALS, supra note 20, at 337.
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For example, some types of risks can be anticipated in advance while
others cannot. One type of regulatory litigation—that which operates
“top down”—focuses on “risks that have already come to pass. In such
instances, the law fills the regulatory gaps by providing individuals the
means to achieve compensation for their injuries. . . . [T]he legislature can do so either through the establishment of administrative
agencies or through the use of substantive law.”138
In these sorts of cases, “courts become regulatory instruments”139
to the extent that they enforce various statutes and administrative pronouncements. This sort of regulatory litigation is quite common, and
“[i]t is for this reason that some authors have suggested that all litigation is regulatory and, in this sense, they are correct.”140
One example of top-down regulatory litigation involves the European regulation141 on passenger rights, which gives airline passengers
the right to private compensation arising from delayed or cancelled
flights.142 The risk of cancelled or delayed flights is already known
and can easily be anticipated to arise again in the future. Providing
passengers with a right to individual compensation serves as a means
of regulating the future behavior of industry actors, with the “penalty”
of a right to individual compensation acting as the catalyst for airlines
to take all reasonable steps to avoid or insure against cancelling or
138 Luff, supra note 8, at 113 (citations omitted).
139 Id.
140 Id.; see also Eric A. Posner, Tobacco Regulation or Litigation?, 70 U. CHI. L. REV.
1141, 1155 (2003) (reviewing W. KIP VISCUSI, SMOKE-FILLED ROOMS (2002)) (arguing
that it is not new to have regulation by litigation); Cassandra Burke Robertson, The
Impact of Third-Party Financing on Transnational Litigation, 44 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L.
159, 174 (2011) (“Both regulation and litigation ultimately have a regulatory effect.”).
141 European regulations are immediately enforceable in the European Union
and do not need to be given domestic effect through the enactment of any enabling
legislation by the individual Member States. See European. Commission, What are EU
Regulations?, http://ec.europa.eu/eu_law/introduction/what_regulation_en.htm
(last visited Sept. 28, 2012). As such, regulations exist in the same form in all Member
States. See id. European directives, on the other hand, must be implemented by
national legislatures before taking effect. See id. As a result, the principles embodied
in a European directive will be available in slightly different form in individual Member States, although the directive should theoretically have the same effect throughout the European Union. See id.
142 See Regulation 261/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11
February 2004 Establishing Common Rules on Compensation and Assistance to Passengers in the Event of Denied Boarding and of Cancellation or Long Delay of
Flights, and Repealing Regulation (EEC) 295/91, 2004 O.J. (L 46) (EC) [hereinafter
Regulation on Passengers’ Rights]; see also KELEMEN, supra note 41, at 1–5 (considering European Union’s passenger rights regulation)
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delaying flights in the future.143 Although the regulation does not
currently include the right to pursue claims collectively, that could
change as a result of procedures contemplated by the Resolution.144
While injuries arising from delayed or cancelled flights are easily
foreseeable, not all risks can be identified in advance.145 This has led
to a second and more controversial type of regulatory litigation,
namely the “bottom-up . . . use of law by judges and litigants.”146 It is
this type of regulatory litigation that is primarily at issue in this Article.
Bottom-up regulatory litigation shares certain functional attributes with top-down regulatory litigation, in that bottom-up regulatory
litigation, “[l]ike legislative efforts to regulate, . . . aims to address
risk.”147 However, it does so in “a different way,” using “the legal remedy or the settlement equivalent in order to influence future, risk-producing behaviors. In cases properly described as regulatory, the
remedy is structured either by a party or by the judge with the intent
of altering future behavior.”148 Although there is some difference of
opinion about certain aspects of bottom-up regulatory litigation, the
three critical elements are: (1) intent, meaning “not only the desire to
influence behavior as the conscious object of the one who would regulate, but also the desire to prevent some future, risk-producing behavior,” (2) a pre-existing substantive norm which is to be enforced by
“the litigant, the judge, or the two acting in concert,” who “intend to
143 See KELEMEN, supra note 41, at 1–5. The regulation primarily operates as an
administrative mechanism, in that it sets the rate of compensation, but specifically
states that it does not limit the right to judicial relief. Regulation on Passenger’s
Rights, supra note 142, ¶ 22, arts. 7–8, 12–13.
144 See Regulation on Passengers’ Rights, supra note 142; Resolution, supra note
20.
145 The problems of unanticipated regulatory issues are readily apparent in the
context of the recent financial crisis. For example, as one commentator noted:
Identifying unanticipated risk is hard and there is no reason to think that
the same busy federal officials, who apparently overlooked these risks in
2006 and 2007, will become more prescient simply because they serve
together on an elite Council. The presence of the one independent expert
is helpful, but there was no lack of experts in the late 2000s who warned of
an impending financial collapse. There were also some savvy investors and
economists who anticipated the collapse, but the financial regulators and
the US intelligence community apparently took no notice of that.
Steve Charnovitz, Addressing Government Failure Through International Financial Law, 13
J. INT’L ECON. L. 743, 748 (2010) (citation omitted).
146 Luff, supra note 8, at 113; see also Robertson, supra note 140, at 175.
147 Luff, supra note 8, at 113.
148 Id.; see also Dorf, supra note 42, at 935–54 (discussing “experimentalist” judging undertaken by “problem-solving” courts that act similarly to “problem-solving”
agencies).
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produce some action on the part of the target of regulation because
of the risk (and the litigant’s or judge’s apprehension of the risk) that
the target actor’s future behavior will fall short of the relevant norm,”
and (3) a rule, typically in the form of a remedy, “that expresses the
norm to the world and attempts to limit the threats (risk) to that
norm.”149
This definition of bottom-up regulatory litigation is quite useful.150 Not only does it identify a functional objective that cannot be
readily addressed by legislative or administrative bodies (i.e., unanticipated risk), it also provides a principled, predictable basis on which
such actions may be based (i.e., a pre-existing substantive norm working in conjunction with a pre-existing rule or remedy).151 However,
application of this standard in cases involving class and collective
relief can be somewhat problematic because the definition of remedies has traditionally been considered to refer only to damages,
injunctions, and declaratory judgments, not the ability to proceed as a
group.152
Some people may see this issue as something of a moot point,
given the number of courts and commentators that have suggested
that the capacity to proceed as a class or collective is a type of remedy.153 However, there are other authorities that frame the ability to
149 Luff, supra note 8, at 113–14. One potential area of disagreement relates to
whether a conscious intent to regulate is really necessary or whether a regulatory
effect is sufficient. Other differences of opinion arise over the necessary extent of the
regulatory effect, with some commentators suggesting that the effect must be felt by
an entire industry while others believe that only the individual defendant needs to be
affected. See id. at 96; Strong, Canada, supra note 79, at 967–70; see also MULHERON,
supra note 9, at 64 (discussing what constitutes regulatory effect).
150 For example, this definition can be used to consider whether certain types of
mass, class, or collective arbitration constitute a form of “regulatory arbitration.” See
S.I. Strong, Mass Procedures as a Form of “Regulatory Arbitration”—Abaclat v. Argentine
Republic and the International Investment Regime, 38 J. CORP. L. (forthcoming 2013),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2146626 [hereinafter Strong, Regulatory Arbitration].
151 See Luff, supra note 8, at 75, 113.
152 See 1 DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES §1.1, at 1–11 (2d ed. 1993); see also
Lorian Hardcastle, Government Tort Liability for Negligence in the Health Sector: A Critique
of the Canadian Jurisprudence, 37 QUEEN’S L.J. 525, 541 (2012) (contrasting judicial
remedies, including damages, injunctions, and declaratory relief, with remedies available to other regulators, including “ombudsmen, commissioners and auditors” whose
powers are typically limited to “publicity and persuasion”).
153 See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 616 (1979) (referring to “class-action
remed[y]”); Jock v. Sterling Jewelers Inc., 646 F.3d 113, 127 (2d Cir. 2011) (referencing “class remedies”), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1742 (2012); Pendergast v. Sprint Nextel
Corp., 592 F.3d 1119, 1139 (11th Cir. 2010) (referring to “class action remedy”); Canfield v. United States, 14 Ct. Cl. 687, 689 (1988) (distinguishing the class remedy
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proceed collectively as a species of right.154 This is cause for some
concern, for although the elevation of a particular concept to the status of a “right” allows that principle to trump or override certain other
laws or practices, a sharp distinction is often made between rights and
remedies.155
The debate between rights and remedies will be taken up more
fully later in this Article.156 However, at this point it is sufficient to
note that concerns about whether and to what extent class or collective relief constitutes a remedy need not bar class or collective actions
from being defined as a form of bottom-up regulatory litigation, since
traditional types of remedies—injunctions, damages, or declaratory
judgments—can be combined with class and collective relief in such a
way that a number of class actions fall within the definition of bottomup regulatory litigation.157 Not only is this useful for purposes of this
Article, in that it allows both U.S. and possibly European forms of class
and collective relief to constitute a form of regulatory litigation, but it
is consistent with conclusions reached by commentators under other
sorts of analyses indicating that some, but not all, class actions contain
a regulatory element.158
A few examples based on Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure will serve to illustrate this point.159 To begin with, injunctions clearly constitute the kind of forward-looking remedy contemplated by the definition of bottom-up regulatory litigation used in this
under the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure);
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 72, at 740 (4th ed. 1983)
(describing class actions as “one of the most socially useful remedies in history”) (citation omitted); Antonio Gidi, Issue Preclusion Effect of Class Certification Orders, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 1023, 1063 & n.185 (2012) [hereinafter Gidi, Issue Preclusion] (citing
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 2.04, at 118–29 (2010)).
154 See infra notes 224–32 and accompanying text.
155 See Andrew Le Sueur, Access to Justice Rights in the United Kingdom, 5 EUR. H.R. L.
REV. 457, 469–74 (2000); J. Harvie Wilkinson III, The Dual Lives of Rights: The Rhetoric
and Practice of Rights in America, 98 CAL. L. REV. 277, 287–89 (2010); see also infra notes
224–31.
156 See infra notes 223–37 and accompanying text.
157 See Luff, supra note 8, at 113.
158 See MULHERON, supra note 9, at 63–66; see infra notes 314–30 and accompanying text.
159 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23. Not all class actions are the same, even within the United
States. For example, courts have recognized that class relief under the Fair Labor
Standards Act is different than that which is available under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. See Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-718, ch. 676, §16, 52
Stat. 1060, 1069 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 216 (2006)); FED. R. CIV. P. 23; Raniere v.
Citigroup, Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 294, 310 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
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discussion.160 Therefore, actions proceeding under Rule 23(b)(2) of
the Federal Rules would qualify as bottom-up litigation, since that rule
provides for injunctive relief on a classwide basis.161
Next, class requests for money damages are often said to constitute a form of regulatory litigation,162 based on empirical research
showing that:
Despite their distaste for class litigation and their dismay about rising numbers of lawsuits, many corporate representatives . . . said
that . . . class litigation had caused them to review financial and
employment practices. Likewise, some manufacturers noted that
heightened concerns about potential class action suits sometimes
have a positive influence on product design decisions.163

However, it is important to identify precisely how this regulatory
effect comes about.164 For example, it is possible to argue that the
high level of compensatory damages associated with a large class constitutes a sufficient disincentive to those who would otherwise be
inclined to act in an unlawful manner, particularly in situations where
it is unlikely that individual compensatory suits would be brought in
the absence of class or collective relief.165 However, experience shows
that there are times when large-scale compensatory relief will not be
sufficient to regulate wrongful behavior because the cost associated
with providing compensation is less than the cost of avoiding harm.166
In those cases, compensatory damages are an insufficient deterrent to
illegal behavior.167
160 See Luff, supra note 8, at 113; see also supra note 148 and accompanying text
(defining bottom-up litigation).
161 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2). Bilateral injunctions could also constitute a form
of regulatory litigation, if the regulatory effect only needs to be felt by the target and
not by the industry as a whole. See Luff, supra note 8, at 113–14; see also supra note
148.
162 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1), (b)(3); HENSLER ET AL., supra note 113, at 68,
71–72.
163 HENSLER ET AL., supra note 113, at 119; see also Russell, supra note 34, at 145–48
(analyzing the deterrence value of class actions).
164 See HENSLER ET AL., supra note 113, at 68, 71–72.
165 Id. at 68; see also Sonja B. Starr, Rethinking “Effective Remedies”: Remedial Deterrence
in International Courts, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 693, 754 (2008) (considering how compensatory relief serves regulatory ends).
166 See Russell, supra note 34, at 145–48. The most well-known example of this
kind of seemingly callous cost-benefit analysis involves Ford Motor Company’s
approach to design defects in the Pinto automobile. See Gary T. Schwartz, The Myth of
the Ford Pinto Case, 43 RUTGERS L. REV. 1013, 1020 (1991).
167 See W. Kip Viscusi, Corporate Risk Analysis: A Reckless Act?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 547,
569 (2000).
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The second and more likely alternative is that the regulatory
effect in cases involving money damages arises by combining the classexpanding aspects of Rule 23 with various statutory or common law
means of imposing treble or punitive damages.168 Various background principles of law, such as the easy availability of contingency
fees and the broad scope of pre-trial discovery, also contribute to the
deterrent effect, since such measures not only allow class lawsuits to
be brought in the first instance but also increase opportunities for
expanding the size of the class, exposing other causes of action and/
or providing the means of prevailing on the merits.169 Therefore, it is
the combination of these various factors—a broad class-expanding
mechanism, a substantive law that provides for damages multipliers
and a variety of pro-plaintiff principles of basic civil procedure—that
provide not only the incentive to bring damages class actions but also
provide much of the regulatory effect.170 Given that one of these necessary elements—money damages—clearly constitutes a type of remedy, this species of class action falls squarely within the definition of
bottom-up regulatory litigation.171
Although these two types of class actions appear to act in a regulatory manner, the same cannot necessarily be said of all forms of largescale legal relief used in the United States. For example, Rule
23(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows parties to
bring class actions so as to avoid potentially inconsistent judgments or
the diminution of other parties’ rights.172 Although these disputes
include some of the same elements seen in Rule 23(b)(3) cases —i.e.,
the class-expanding mechanism and various litigation incentives as a
matter of basic procedural law—it is not clear whether damages multi168 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). Sometimes treble damages are available as a matter of statutory law. See Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 78u1(a) (2006); Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act, 18 U.S.C.
1964(c) (2006); Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., 483 U.S. 143, 151
(1987) (“Both RICO and the Clayton Act are designed to remedy economic injury by
providing for the recovery of treble damages, costs, and attorney’s fees.”); Glover,
supra note 2, at 1151. Other times, multiplers are imposed as a matter of common
law. See Jim Gash, The End of an Era: The Supreme Court (Finally) Butts Out of Punitive
Damages for Good, 63 FLA. L. REV. 525, 531 (2011).
169 See Nagareda, supra note 10, at 2; Strong, Mass Torts, supra note 78.
170 See HENSLER ET AL., supra note 113, at 71–72; Hensler, supra note 15, at 25–26;
Hodges, Resolving, supra note 34, at 336.
171 See Hodges, Resolving, supra note 34, at 336; see also Luff, supra note 8, at 113;
supra note 148 and accompanying text.
172 The paradigmatic example here involves disputes involving a limited fund. See
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1); Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999).
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pliers would always be available in these types of disputes.173 While
plaintiffs could attempt to certify an individual damages dispute
under Rule 23(b)(1) or Rule 23(b)(2) simply as a means of avoiding
the more onerous notice provisions under Rule 23(b)(3), such efforts
are less likely to succeed given the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent decision in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes.174 Therefore, cases arising under
Rule 23(b)(1) appear to focus more on concerns about fairness and
efficiency than on regulation, although a full functional or empirical
analysis could prove otherwise.175
Class actions are not the only type of large-scale litigation available in the United States. Federal multi-district litigation (MDL)176 has
been receiving an increased amount of attention over the last few
years177 as a result of several recent decisions from the U.S. Supreme
Court that appear to curtail parties’ ability to seek large-scale representative relief.178 Although “MDL aggregation is not exactly an alter173 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1). For example, while the substantive law in question
could provide for punitive or treble damages, there may not be sufficient commonality among the plaintiff group to allow the effective imposition of such damages. Compare Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 864 (suggesting that “it would be essential that the fund be
shown to be limited independently of the agreement” and “that the class include all
those with claims unsatisfied at the time of the settlement negotiations, with intraclass
conflicts addressed by recognizing independently represented subclasses”), with FED.
R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1) (not requiring commonality of facts or law). Furthermore, parties
to a Rule 23(b)(1) case may sometimes agree to limit the availability of any punitive
damages claims. See id. 23(b)(1); Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 827.
174 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2558 (2011) (reasoning that individual monetary claims
belong in Rule 23(b)(3) and are not to be combined with classwide relief in a Rule
23(b)(2) class); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b) (explaining ways a class action may be
maintained).
175 See Wal-Mart Stores, 131 S. Ct. at 2558 (“Classes certified under (b)(1) and
(b)(2) share the most traditional justifications for class treatment—that individual
adjudications would be impossible or unworkable, as in a (b)(1) class, or that the
relief sought must perforce affect the entire class at once, as in a (b)(2) class.” (citation omitted)). A full functional or empirical analysis of Rule 23(b)(1) cases is
beyond the scope of this Article. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1).
176 See 28 U.S.C. §1407 (2006); Hensler, supra note 15, at 16–17; HENSLER ET AL.,
supra note 113, at 99; Glover, supra note 2, at 1213–14.
177 Some U.S. commentators believe that use of aggregative techniques such as
MDL is likely to rise because of the difficulties associated with certification of classes
in mass torts cases. See Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 815; Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521
U.S. 591 (1997); Thomas E. Willging & Emery G. Lee III, From Class Actions to Multidistrict Consolidations: Aggregate Mass-Tort Litigation After Ortiz, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 775,
776–77, 806 (2010).
178 See Wal-Mart Stores, 131 S. Ct. at 2541; AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131
S. Ct. 1740 (2011); Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct 1758
(2010). Not all commentators read these decisions as being entirely negative. See
Judith Resnik, Comment, Fairness in Numbers: A Comment on AT&T v. Concepcion,
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native to class action” litigation,179 MDL nevertheless provides a
solution to the problem of mass legal injuries by combining various
individual claims “involving one or more common questions of fact”
on an aggregative, rather than representative basis.180 This means
that claims are combined only for “coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings”181 and are subsequently disaggregated to address
individual issues and provide final disposition of the claims.182
In some ways, it might seem as if MDL cannot provide any regulatory effect, since the judge hearing the consolidated matter is not providing the ultimate remedy (i.e., injunctive, monetary, or declarative
relief) that would drive the defendant or other industry actors to alter
their future behavior.183 However, bottom-up regulation can be based
not only on a rule or remedy, but also on “the settlement equivalent”
thereof.184 Since aggregation under the MDL framework can drive
settlement in the same way that class certification decisions do, MDL
may be capable of acting as a regulatory device.185 Although this is an
interesting proposition, more work, particularly of a functional and

Wal-Mart v. Dukes, and Turner v. Rogers, 125 HARV. L. REV. 78 (2011); S.I. Strong,
Does Class Arbitration “Change the Nature” of Arbitration? Stolt-Nielsen, AT&T and a
Return to First Principles, 17 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 201 (2012) [hereinafter Strong, First
Principles].
179 Willging & Lee, supra note 177, at 794.
180 28 U.S.C. § 1407.
181 Id. (“Each action so transferred shall be remanded by the panel at or before
the conclusion of such pretrial proceedings to the district from which it was transferred. . . .”); see also Hensler, supra note 15, at 16–17 (noting that once the pretrial
process is finished, mass claims are “disaggregated and dispersed to the courts where
they were initially filed for final disposition”).
182 See Hensler, supra note 15, at 16–17.
183 See 28 U.S.C. §1407; Luff, supra note 8, at 113. See generally DOBBS, supra note
152 (discussing availability of remedies and their effect on future conduct).
184 Luff, supra note 8, at 113. This focus on “the settlement equivalent” raises the
question of whether actions under Rule 23(b)(1) can also be considered regulatory.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1); see also supra notes 172–175 and accompanying text (discussing Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). While a regulatory effect is
theoretically possible, empirical work would be helpful to determine whether such
effect exists as a functional matter.
185 See Hensler, supra note 15, at 16–17 (noting most aggregated claims settle); see
also Jeremy T. Grabill, Judicial Review of Private Mass Tort Settlements, 42 SETON HALL L.
REV. 123 (2012) (“Settlement is the ‘endgame’ of mass tort litigation. And with the
general demise of class actions in this field, mass tort litigation is increasingly resolved
through non-class aggregate settlements.”); id. at 139–53 (discussing the evolution of
non-class aggregate settlements); HENSLER ET AL., supra note 113, at 108–09.
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empirical nature, needs to be done before any conclusions can be
made about how MDL operates in the U.S. regulatory regime.186
As the preceding suggests, U.S. class actions can be considered
regulatory even if the ability to proceed as a class is not considered a
remedy of itself. This discussion has also shown that it is impossible to
conclude that class or aggregative procedures fulfill a regulatory function simply by virtue of the number of participants, since some other
factors must be present to create the necessary regulatory effect.187
This conclusion is important, since it suggests that the procedures
contemplated by the Resolution cannot provide a regulatory effect
simply by virtue of their collective nature.188
c. Substantive and Procedural Risk
The next question to consider is whether and to what extent a
legal system can or should allow unanticipated risk to be resolved
through bottom-up regulatory litigation and whether all sorts of unanticipated risk should be considered in the same light.189 This analysis
is important because what looks like an unanticipated risk in some
legal systems may be framed in other jurisdictions as a conscious
choice to leave those risks unregulated. In the latter situation, bottom-up regulatory litigation would be jurisprudentially illegitimate,
even if it constituted an effective means of addressing such risks,
because such mechanisms would be contrary to that legal system’s
institutional design.190
Traditionally, European jurisdictions have resisted bottom-up
regulatory litigation on the grounds that “decisions on the appropriate scope of regulatory protection” should “be left to . . . politically
186 See Glover, supra note 2, at 1213–14 (suggesting MDL procedures can operate
in a regulatory manner). Thus far, much of the scholarly focus on MDL has been on
procedural issues rather than regulatory or policy concerns regarding matters of institutional design. See Judith Resnik, Money Matters: Judicial Market Interventions Creating
Subsidies and Awarding Fees and Costs in Individual and Aggregate Litigation, 148 U. PA. L.
REV. 2119 (2000); Charles Silver & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Quasi-Class Action Method of
Managing Multi-District Litigations: Problems and a Proposal, 63 VAND. L. REV. 107 (2010).
187 See supra notes 158–71 and accompanying text.
188 See Resolution, supra note 20; see also infra Part IV (explaining regulatory litigation in Europe).
189 See Luff, supra note 8, at 75, 113–14.
190 Commentators have, of course, questioned whether regulatory litigation actually fulfills its regulatory objectives effectively and without any undue ancillary effects
and market distortions, but that is a different question than the one posed here. See
Hodges, ANNALS, supra note 20, at 336.
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accountable actors.”191 Under this view, regulatory litigation constitutes an illegitimate usurpation of legislative or administrative authority because such measures allow judges and litigants to operate in “the
presence of regulatory gaps” that are considered conscious “policy
decisions on the part of agencies and the legislature.”192
While that analysis may make sense in cases where the type of risk
at issue has been identified in advance (since the failure to regulate in
those situations obviously reflects a conscious policy decision on the
part of the democratically elected branches of government), arguments about the judiciary improperly infringing on the legislative prerogative carry less weight in situations where the risk is
unanticipated.193 Indeed, it is difficult to say that courts and private
actors are acting in contravention to policy decisions made by the legislature if the legislature never considered the matter in question.194
When viewed in this light, bottom-up regulatory litigation
appears as less of “an ad hoc supplement to public law”195 and more
of an essential element of a comprehensive regulatory regime. As
such, regulatory litigation can be viewed as consistent with, rather
than in conflict with, public forms of regulation, “[e]ven when public
enforcement is relatively robust,” since “private enforcement may
191 Luff, supra note 8, at 113. Of course, other commentators view the existence
of regulatory gaps as reflecting a need for private action. See Kevin R. Johnson, International Human Rights Class Actions: New Frontiers for Group Litigation, 2004 MICH. ST. L.
REV. 643, 654–659 (noting this need may arise particularly in cases where there has
been “political failure” or where those with “no potential for [political] redress” have
been affected).
192 Luff, supra note 8, at 113. Top-down regulatory litigation has not suffered
from these same kinds of criticisms, since it grows out of “statutory designs that evince
a conscious choice on the part of the legislators to vest regulatory enforcement
authority in private parties.” Id. at 95. Indeed, the European Union already utilizes
top-down regulatory litigation, as shown by the passengers’ rights example. See Regulation on Passengers’ Rights, supra note 142; see also supra notes 141–46 and accompanying text (analyzing top-down regulatory litigation involings the European
regulation on passenger rights).
193 Some distinction could be made between risk that was unanticipated and risk
that was unable to be anticipated, but that discussion will be left for another day. See
supra note 145 (noting a risk that was anticipatable, but not anticipated by the relevant regulatory authorities).
194 See Luff, supra note 8, at 75.
195 Glover, supra note 2, at 1137. This consistency becomes more apparent when
the various elements of regulatory litigation are identified. See supra note 149 and
accompanying text. Notably, public means of enforcement do not need to fail completely before private remedies can be sought. Glover, supra note 2, at 1155. Furthermore, any system that allows both public and private forms of regulation must be
careful to avoid duplication of efforts and over-deterrence. See id. at 1158–59.
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serve a complementary regulatory role in the achievement of various
substantive goals.”196
While this analysis may overcome some of the criticism aimed at
regulatory litigation, it may not be enough to overcome skepticism
based on the view that the substance of public regulation must be
determined by politically accountable actors.197 However, those concerns can be met through further refinements to the concept of unanticipated risk.
One of the seminal cases on U.S. class actions, Deposit Guaranty
National Bank v. Roper, holds that:
[t]he aggregation of individual claims in the context of a classwide
suit is an evolutionary response to the existence of injuries
unremedied by the regulatory action of government. Where it is
not economically feasible to obtain relief within the traditional
framework of a multiplicity of small individual suits for damages,
aggrieved persons may be without any effective redress unless they
may employ the class-action device.198

According to this decision, class relief developed as a functional
response to certain “injuries unremedied by the regulatory action of
government,” i.e., certain unanticipated risks.199 However, the risks at
issue cannot relate to the type of injury, since the three-prong test for
regulatory litigation indicates that claims must be made under a pre-

196 Glover, supra note 2, at 1158; see also Lesley K. McAllister, Regulation by ThirdParty Verification, 53 B.C. L. REV. 1, 4 (2012) (describing the interplay between public
and private concerns in third-party verification).
197 See Nathan Howe, The Political Question Doctrine’s Role in Climate Change Nuisance
Litigation: Are Power Utilities the First of Many Casualties?, 40 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS &
ANALYSIS 11229, 11238–40 (2010) (discussing courts’ views on the propriety of litigation prior to the enactment of legislation); Andrew P. Morriss et al., Choosing How to
Regulate, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 179, 248 (2005). Some public bodies may consciously choose not to act in some cases, although “[o]ne of the most significant risks
of executive-driven moratoria is their likelihood to invite legal battles.” Kathryn A.
Watts, Regulatory Moratoria, 61 DUKE L.J. 1883, 1927 (2012).
198 Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339 (1980). While this statement could be read as implicating certain concerns relating to compensation and
efficiency, the reference to “injuries unremedied by the regulatory action of government” establishes a firm link to regulatory concerns. Id.
199 Id. Actually, this language could be read even more broadly to include risks
that were anticipated but left unregulated for whatever reason. See supra note 197.
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existing substantive norm.200 Instead, the unanticipated risk must be
something other than substantive.201
Closer contemplation of Deposit Guaranty National Bank suggests
that the risk in question refers either to the scope of injury (such as an
unanticipated volume of harm) or to the nature of the injury (such as
an unexpectedly low value of each individual claims).202 In other
words, the legislature anticipated a particular type of substantive harm
but did not anticipate the possibility that the standard method of
addressing the harm (i.e., bilateral litigation) would be incapable of
sufficiently deterring the behavior in question. Instead, certain unexpected aspects of the injury generated the need to use a particular
procedural mechanism (i.e., class or collective techniques) to provide
an adequate legal response.203 Because the unanticipated element
here relates to certain procedural needs, bottom-up regulatory litigation can be said to provide a response to an unanticipated procedural
risk.
While Deposit Guaranty National Bank suggests one type of unanticipated procedural risk,204 class and collective claims may generate
other types of procedural risks. For example, it is possible to consider
the likelihood of inconsistent judgments from the perspective of risk,
even though most discussions relating to large-scale litigation appear
to analyze inconsistent judgments under the rubric of procedural fairness.205 However, it can be said that inconsistent judgments arise
when the state has contemplated a particular type of substantive harm
but has not anticipated the magnitude of claims that would ensue and
the possibility that some of those judgments might be inconsistent

200 See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 613 (1997) (discussing that
Rule 23 cannot “abridge, enlarge or modify” any substantive right (citation omitted)).
A pre-existing substantive norm constitutes the second element of the three-prong
test for bottom-up regulatory litigation. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
201 See Luff, supra note 8, at 75, 113.
202 See Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank, 445 U.S. at 339; see also Abaclat (formerly Beccara)
v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, Decision on Jurisdiction and
Admissibility, ¶ 483 (Aug. 4, 2011) [hereinafter Abaclat Award], available at http://
italaw.com/documents/AbaclatDecisiononJurisdiction.pdf; S.I Strong, From Class to
Collective: The De-Americanization of Class Arbitration, 26 ARB. INT’L 493, 502 (2010)
[hereinafter Strong, De-Americanization].
203 See Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank, 445 U.S. at 339; see also Abaclat Award, supra note
202, ¶ 483; Strong, De-Americanization, supra note 202, at 502.
204 See Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank, 445 U.S. at 339.
205 See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 330 n.14 (1979); Ellis v. Ga.Pac. Corp., 550 So. 2d 1310, 1318 (La. Ct. App. 1989).
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with one another.206 As such, class and collective relief can be viewed
as providing an adequate, albeit unanticipated, procedural response
to a particular type of procedural risk.
Framing bottom-up regulatory litigation as a means of addressing
unanticipated procedural risk could resolve the concerns of those
who worry that regulatory litigation constitutes an impermissible
infringement on the proper domain of politically accountable actors
because procedural matters can be viewed as being more properly
within the scope of judicial rather than legislative or administrative
authority.207 Furthermore, even this limited judicial power remains
subject to the oversight of democratically elected branches of government because legislatures are enabled to enact subsequent legislation
or regulation that reverses the course of most types of any regulatory
litigation, if the elected officials find those decisions problematic.208
Indeed, legislative overrides have often been used in the United States
when the political branches believe the courts have overstepped their
bounds with regard to class relief.209
206 See Strong, Regulatory Arbitration, supra note 150, at 73–74 (discussing how
investment law failed to foresee problems of inconsistent results). The possibility of
inconsistent judgments is considered relevant to the creation of some (but not all)
types of class actions, although those suits are not necessarily regulatory in nature. See
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(A); see also supra notes 172–175 and accompanying text
(describing fairness and consistency of judgments).
207 This is particularly true given that there is some legislative oversight of judicial
rule-making. See Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071–72, 2074 (2006) (requiring
Congressional approval of rules of court, including the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); see also Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431
(2010); Allan Ides, The Standard for Measuring the Validity of a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure: The Shady Grove Debate Between Justices Scalia and Stevens, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1041, 1066–67 (2011) (discussing legislative limits on judicial rule-making).
208 The one exception would be in constitutional cases in legal systems where the
courts have the final say on such matters. See Dimitrios Kyritsis, Constitutional Review
in Representative Democracy, 32 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 297, 320–24 (2012).
209 Many of these enactments have focused on the availability or scope of the class
mechanism rather the underlying substantive law, which not only suggests that the
legislature is acting in a counter-regulatory manner but also supports the notion that
regulatory litigation focuses on procedural, rather than substantive, risks. See Class
Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 2(a)(4), (b), 119 Stat. 4, 4–5 (2005)
(codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1711 (2006)); Omnibus Consolidated Recessions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134, § 504(a)(7), 110 Stat. 1321, 1321–53
(1996) (limiting availability of legal aid in class actions); Prison Litigation Reform Act
of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321–66 (1996) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3626,
28 U.S.C. §§ 1915, 1915(f), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (2006)); Glover, supra note 2, at
1165; Greenberg, supra note 124, at 579; Johnson, supra note 191, at 646–47; George
Rutherglen, Wal-Mart, AT&T Mobility, and the Decline of the Deterrent Class Action, 98
VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 24, 28 (2012), available at http://www.virginialawreview.org/
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This dynamic interaction between the various branches of government suggests that bottom-up regulatory litigation does not constitute a private form of regulation, operating outside the scope of
political debate and discourse. To the contrary, the process appears
highly iterative, with the judicial, legislative, and executive branches
working responsively rather than in isolation.
If this is true, then the real debate is not about whether and to
what extent bottom-up regulation contravenes the will of politically
elected officials.210 Instead, the focus is more on default preferences211 and where the risk of action (or inaction) should lie as a
matter of institutional design.212 While this issue is beyond the scope
of this Article, it is well-covered by other commentators.213
inbrief.php?s=inbrief&p=2012/04/14/post. Although most subsequent measures
have focused on limiting judges’ and litigants’ ability to obtain class relief, legislators
have also taken steps to correct situations where the courts have improperly restricted
class relief, thus returning the scope or availability of the class device to its previously
expansive state. See Greenberg, supra note 124, at 585–86 (discussing employment
discrimination).
210 See supra notes 207–209 and accompanying text.
211 Although commentators have focused heavily on the analysis of default rules in
the context of contract and corporate law, relatively little attention has been paid to
default provisions in the realm of regulatory litigation and other questions of institutional design. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An
Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 89 (1989) (noting lack of scholarship
on default rules); see also Ian Ayres, Valuing Modern Contract Scholarship, 112 YALE L.J.
881, 885 (2003) (supporting modern contract scholarship and results it provides in
“clarifying . . . contract rules,” “illuminating . . . default rule[s],” and “underscoring
. . . renegotiation”); Ian Ayres & Robert Gernter, Majoritarian vs. Minoritarian Defaults,
51 STAN. L. REV. 1591, 1591 (1999) (discussing optimal default rules for contractual
incompleteness through understanding underlying reasons for the incompleteness);
Ian Ayres & Robert Gernter, Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the Optimal Choice of
Legal Rules, 101 YALE L.J. 729, 729–30 (1992) (explaining gap-filling for incomplete
contracts); Jason Scott Johnston, Strategic Bargaining and the Economic Theory of Contract
Default Rules, 100 YALE L.J. 615, 615 (1990) (analyzing the economic impact of Hadley
v. Baxendale); Eric A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Contract Law After Three Decades: Success or Failure?, 112 YALE L.J. 829, 834, 839 (2003) (comparing how contract lawyers
and economists construct default rules about contracts).
212 See Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths
and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 840–70 (2004); Michael D.
Sant’Ambrogio, Agency Delays: How a Principal-Agent Approach Can Inform Judicial and
Executive Branch Review of Agency Foot-Dragging, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1381, 1387
(2011).
213 See supra note 46 and accompanying text. Notably, however, many questions
about whether regulatory litigation is inherently better than traditional forms of regulation typically cannot be answered empirically. Thus, for example, while it might be
useful to ask which regulatory mechanism—regulatory litigation or traditional regulation—is capable of responding most speedily to changed or changing circumstances,
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Framing bottom-up regulatory litigation as a means of addressing
unanticipated procedural risks also provides the means of responding
to other potential areas of concern. For example, some critics might
claim that remedy-based regulation does not provide sufficient predictability to parties to allow them to alter their behavior to reduce the
risk of liability or obtain the necessary insurance.214
While predictability is of course important, that concern appears
to be met to the extent that regulatory litigation is based on both a
pre-existing substantive norm and a pre-existing rule or remedy.215
Because potential defendants are on notice that they may be subject
to a particular type of remedy if their action causes injury, they can
take adequate precautions so as to avoid or limit legal liability,216 even
if the precise type of injury or scope (i.e., the unanticipated procedural risk) cannot be anticipated.217 Notably, defendants are not
responsible for all unanticipated risks, since bottom-up regulatory litino definitive answer appears to exist. See Kerr, supra note , at 840–70 (considering
whether courts are at a comparative disadvantage in regulating areas that are rapidly
changing due to difficulties in revising judicial doctrines and precedent);
Sant’Ambrogio, supra note 212, at 1387 (discussing problems associated with agency
delays).
214 This problem is not limited to regulatory litigation, since traditional forms of
regulation can often be equally difficult to interpret and predict. See McAllister, supra
note 196, at 22.
215 See Luff, supra note 8, at 114; see also Dorf, supra note 42, at 876–77; supra notes
149, 152 and accompanying text (explaining bottom-up regulatory litigation).
216 The type of precautions to be taken depends on the nature of the substantive
risk in question and not on the likelihood of bilateral versus multilateral litigation.
For example, a pharmaceuticals manufacturer might undergo additional testing so as
to avoid any potential claims that personal injuries that might arise from the use of a
particular drug were negligently caused, while a national corporation might require
extensive management training and voluntary internal audits of regional hiring or
promotion practices so as to anticipate and avoid claims of employment discrimination. See Daphné Richemond-Barak, Regulating War: A Taxonomy in Global Administrative Law, 22 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1027, 1056–67 (2011). Although some critics see these
sorts of “defensive” measures as unnecessarily costly and socially undesirable to the
extent they delay certain products (such as pharmaceuticals) from reaching the market or increase the cost of those items, self-restraint (like self-regulation) may be preferable to mandatory forms of public regulation, which could be more onerous. See
Frank B. Cross, Tort Law and the American Economy, 96 MINN. L. REV. 28, 29–30 (2011);
see infra notes 257–270 and accompanying text.
217 However, the possibility of regulatory litigation may provide the incentive to
undertake the precautionary measures in question, although the desire to avoid regulatory litigation does not depend on whether the suit involves class or collective relief.
See Glover, supra note 2, at 1190–91 (suggesting that in some situations—such as
large-scale RICO actions—aggregative or class-expanding mechanisms may not be
necessary, since the treble damages provisions alone are sufficient to provide a regulatory effect).
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gation does not impose a system of strict liability, unless such an
approach is permitted under the applicable substantive law.218
Instead, the defendant in a remedy-based form of regulatory litigation
is only liable to the extent identified in the relevant substantive
norm.219
d. The Nature of the Ability to Proceed as a Class or
Collective
This Article’s concept of a regulatory remedy does not require
class or collective mechanisms to be considered remedial in nature.220
Instead, the requirements for bottom-up regulatory litigation can be
met in cases involving class and collective relief by combining traditional remedies with large-scale litigation techniques and various background principles of procedural law.221 This approach is not only
useful in discussions under U.S. law, it is also helpful in analyses
involving European law, since the analytical framework does not
reflect a bias towards U.S. forms of collective justice.222
Although it is not necessary to delve more deeply into the nature
of class and collective procedures, it is worthwhile to do so briefly,
since differences in the way the ability to proceed as a group is characterized may help explain why regulatory litigation is so difficult for
some people to accept in both the United States and Europe.223 As it
turns out, the key issues appear to arise as a result of two interrelated
jurisprudential traditions, namely the longstanding elevation of (1)
rights over remedies and (2) substantive over procedural law.224
218 See Luff, supra note 8, at 113; see also supra notes 149–152 and accompanying
text (discussing the role substantive law plays in bottom-up regulatory litigation).
219 See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
220 See supra notes 172–87 and accompanying text.
221 See supra notes 148, 172–87 and accompanying text.
222 See Resolution, supra note 20; see also infra Part IV (analyzing regulatory litigation in Europe).
223 Some authorities frame the ability to proceed as class or collective as a remedy.
See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 616 (1979); Jock v. Sterling Jewelers Inc., 646 F.3d
113, 127 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1742 (2012); Pendergast v. Sprint
Nextel Corp., 592 F.3d 1119, 1139 (11th Cir. 2010); Canfield v. United States, 14 Cl.
Ct. 687, 689 (1988); Gidi, Issue Preclusion, supra note 153, at 1065 & n. 185; WRIGHT,
supra note 153, §72, at 740. Others suggest it may be some type of right. See Amchem
Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 613 (1997); Gidi, Issue Preclusion, supra note
153, at 1065 & n.185.
224 Although detailed consideration of this issue is beyond the scope of this Article, it would be very useful to conduct a rights-balancing analysis concerning class and
collective relief, on the one hand, and regulatory concerns on the other. Some general information on this topic is available. See Robert G. Bone, Agreeing to Fair Process:
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First, some people appear to view bottom-up regulatory litigation
as less valuable or less legitimate because it appears to involve a remedy rather than a right.225 As Owen Fiss has noted, there is a long and
“complicated relationship between rights and remedies,” based largely
on the common (mis)perception that:
Rights are “the true meaning of . . . constitutional values, such as
equality, liberty, due process, or property. . . .” Remedies are
designed to “actualize” the constitutional value and incorporate
considerations that are not principled corollaries of the constitutional value but rather are “subsidiary,” “strategic,” and “instrumental.” Thus, remedies are “subordinate” to rights. They are not only
subordinate, but also metaphysically segregated, for “rights operate
in the world of abstraction, remedies in the world of practical reality.” . . . Although Fiss wants to keep judges in the business of remedies, he worries that judges will distort the true meaning of
constitutional rights by tailoring them to fit what effective remedies
are available. Fiss fears that the purity of rights will be corrupted by
the practicalities of remedies.226

Second, even if the ability to proceed as a group is considered a
right rather than a remedy, that right may be characterized as
“merely” procedural rather than substantive.227 This can be problematic, for although a growing number of commentators recognize that
procedure and substance are inextricably linked,228 there nevertheless
The Problem with Contractarian Theories of Procedural Fairness, 83 B.U. L. REV. 485, 535
(2003); Virgı́lio Afonso da Silva, Comparing the Incommensurable: Constitutional Principles, Balancing and Rational Decision, 31 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 273, 284–299 (2011);
Le Sueur, supra note 155, at 473.
225 See Luff, supra note 8, at 113. Interestingly, the two concepts do not have to be
mutually exclusive. See Margaux J. Hall & David C. Weiss, Human Rights and Remedial
Equilibration: Equilibrating Socio-Economic Rights, 36 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 453, 501 (2011)
(discussing how rights may incorporate a remedy); see also Strong, Regulatory Arbitration, supra note 150, at 64–81 (discussing how investment law may recognize a right to
a remedy).
226 Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L.
REV. 857, 870–71 (1999) (citations omitted) (discussing Owen M. Fiss, Foreword: The
Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1979)); see also id. at 857–58 (explaining difference
between rights and remedies). The notion that remedies are in some way
subordinate to rights may also be reflected in the laws of some European Member
States. See Antony Lester, The Human Rights Act 1998—Five Years On, 2004 EUR. H.R.
L. REV. 258, 260.
227 See Amchem Prods., 521 U.S. at 613; see also Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010); Bisaillon v. Concordia University, [2006] 1
S.C.R. 666 ¶¶ 15, 17 (Can.); Strong, Canada, supra note 79, at 965–75.
228 See Jamie Dodge, The Limits of Private Procedural Ordering, 97 VA. L. REV. 723,
733 (2011); see also Abaclat (formerly Beccara) v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No.
ARB/07/5, Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Dissenting Opinion 86 (Oct.
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appears to be a lingering perception that matters of substance are
more important than matters of procedure.229 This may be particularly true in the United States, where a number of recent decisions
from the U.S. Supreme Court have reputedly signaled “[t]he conversion of procedural rules from publicly created, mandatory guarantors
of procedural justice to default rules subject to market forces.”230
This is said to “alter[ ] the nature and function of civil procedure at a
basic level” by challenging “the traditional conception of private
enforcement as serving a dual public and private role.”231
Although judicial discussions regarding the nature of the ability
to proceed as a class or collective have thus far been somewhat unsatisfactory due to their highly formalistic nature, U.S. courts currently
appear to view the right as procedural rather than substantive.232
Commentators have taken a different view, suggesting that it may be
appropriate to consider the right to proceed as a class as substantive in
nature, at least in some circumstances.233 The European Union
appears poised to adopt a proceduralist interpretation, based on language in the Resolution stating that “access to justice by means of collective redress comes within the sphere of procedural law.”234
Consideration of this issue is still in its early days. However, as the
discussion goes forward, courts and commentators may wish to think
28, 2011), available at http://italaw.com/documents/Abaclat_Dissenting_Opinion.
pdf.
229 The elevation of substance over procedure may be more apparent in civil law
than in criminal law. See Dodge, supra note 228, at 731–57. Indeed, some commentators have suggested that criminal law protects procedure more than substance. See
Nancy Gertner, On Competence, Legitimacy and Proportionality, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1585,
1595 n.57 (2012); Jessica Brooks, Note, Two-Way Video Testimony and the Confrontation
Clause: Protecting Vulnerable Victims After Crawford, 8 STAN. J. CIV.RTS. & CIV. LIBERTIES
183, 184 (2012).
230 Dodge, supra note 228, at 725.
231 Id. at 725–26.
232 For example, courts have been known to rely solely on the placement of the
right in the relevant rules of civil procedure. See Amchem Prods., 521 U.S. at 613 (discussing Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and noting that Rule 23 cannot “abridge,
enlarge or modify” any substantive right and should, as such, be considered procedural in nature); see also Shady Grove, 130 S.Ct. at 1442 (describing what constitutes a
procedural right); Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 332 (1980) (noting the right of a litigant to employ Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or
the collective action procedures under the FLSA “is a procedural right only, ancillary
to the litigation of substantive claims”); Bisaillon, 1 S.C.R. 666, ¶¶ 15, 17; Strong,
Canada, supra note 79, at 965–75.
233 See Gidi, Issue Preclusion, supra note 153, at 1063 & n.185; Greenberg, supra
note 124, at 577 (regarding injunctive relief); Strong, Canada, supra note 79, at
965–75.
234 Resolution, supra note 20, ¶ 15.
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about whether rights really are distinct from remedies and whether it
would be possible to construe particular substantive rights as including a right to a particular remedy.235 Alternatively, it might be possible to argue that certain procedural rights have been elevated to the
status of a substantive right.236 While these propositions are by no
means universally accepted,237 they do indicate areas for further discussion and debate.238
Although European authorities may be predisposed to characterize the right to collective relief as procedural in nature,239 that right
may be given somewhat elevated status in practice, based on statements in the Resolution that “in the European area of justice, citizens
and companies must not only enjoy rights but must also be able to
enforce those rights effectively and efficiently”240 and an increasing
inclination in the European Union to provide procedural rights with a
high degree of protection and respect as a general concern.241
This emphasis on procedural justice is reflected most clearly in
the concept of an effective remedy, which is explicitly protected as a
235 See Hall & Weiss, supra note 225, at 501 (discussing how rights may incorporate
a remedy); Wilkinson, supra note 155, at 288.
236 This may be the case in international investment law. See CAMPBELL MCLACHLAN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARBITRATION § 3.01 (2007) (suggesting that
“[t]he protection offered to investors by the dispute resolution provisions of treaties is
sufficiently important to rise to the level of a substantive principle in its own right”).
See generally Strong, Regulatory Arbitration, supra note 150, at 64–81 (discussing how
investment law may recognize a right to a remedy).
237 See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1444–46; Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1,
13–14 (1941) (noting the term “substantive right” did not include procedural rights,
even if they were “important” or “substantial”); Ides, supra note 207, at 1054.
238 The U.S. Supreme Court recently addressed certain issues regarding potential
overlaps between substantive and procedural rights in the context of federal diversity
class actions, which may generate more detailed analysis by both courts and commentators. See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1442–48. Justice Stevens’ concurrence, which
controls the plurality opinion, is particularly interesting in this regard. See id. at
1448–50 (Stevens., J., concurring); see also Julia B. Strickland et al., 2010 Class Action
Developments, 1946 PLI/CORP. 537, 541–43 (Apr. 9–10, 2012) (explaining the Shady
Grove decision).
239 See Resolution, supra note 20, ¶ 15.
240 Id. ¶ A; see also id. ¶¶ E, 17 (noting importance of procedural rights).
241 See Burkhard Hess, Procedural Harmonisation in a European Context, in CIVIL LITIGATION IN A GLOBALIZING WORLD 159, 169–72 (X.E. Kramer & C.H. van Rhee ed.,
2012); Le Sueur, supra note 155, at 475; see also Mauro Cappelletti, Fundamental Guarantees of the Parties in Civil Litigation: Comparative Constitutional, International, and Social
Trends, 25 STAN. L. REV. 651, 652 (1973) (examining “the more significant aspects of
procedural gurantees”). See generally Strong, Quo Vadis, supra note 34 (examining
new European resolution creating an avenue for regional collective relief).
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matter of national, international, and European law.242 Thus, for
example, Article 13 of the European Convention on Human Rights
states that “[e]veryone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this
Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a
national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.”243 Article 47 of the
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union similarly states
that “[e]veryone whose rights and freedoms guaranteed by the law of
the Union are violated has the right to an effective remedy before a
tribunal in compliance with the conditions laid down in this Article.”244 Although no court has yet interpreted the “effective remedy”
language of these provisions in the context of collective redress, it
appears likely that the term will be interpreted expansively, since such
procedures are often considered to constitute a necessary procedural
response to a particular type of injury.245
While it is important to determine whether the right to proceed
as a class or collective is substantive or procedural in nature, an
equally critical concern involves whether the right should be considered private, and thus held by an individual, or public, and thus held
either by the group of persons asserting the claim or by society at
large.246 The answer to this latter question can determine whether
242 See Le Sueur, supra note 155, at 458. See generally Strong, Quo Vadis, supra note
34 (discussing European adoption of cross-border collective redress claims). The
notion of an effective remedy also underlies U.S. jurisprudence, though more implicitly. See Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339 (1980).
243 European Convention on Human Rights, art. 13, effective June 1, 2010 (as
amended by Protocols Nos. 11 & 14), available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/
en/Treaties/Html/005.htm; see also Le Sueur, supra note 155, at 457–58 (discussing
the right to an effective remedy under the European Convention on Human Rights).
244 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2000/C 364/1, art. 47,
18 Dec. 2000; see also Pieter Van Cleynenbreugel, Judge-Made Standards of National Procedure in the Post-Lisbon Constitutional Framework, 37 EUR. L. REV. 90, 95–97 (2012) (discussing the “fundamental right to an effective ‘remedy’ ”); Hess, supra note 241, at
§ 8.4; Sionaidh Douglas-Scott, The Charter of Fundamental Rights as a Constitutional Document, 2004 EUR. H.R. L. REV. 37, 46 (explaining the current limited system of remedies for private parties).
245 See KELEMEN, supra note 41, at 14 (noting “the broad empowerment of private
actors to assert their legal rights”); Abaclat Award, supra note 202, ¶ 483; Glover, supra
note 2, at 1137; Strong, De-Americanization, supra note 202, at 502; see also supra
notes 202–219 and accompanying text (analyzing procedural risks).
246 See Dodge, supra note 228, at 770–83 (explaining the public-private distinction). Western legal analysis tends to focus on individual rights and remedies rather
than group rights. See Mark Tushnet, The Constitution of Religion, 18 CONN. L. REV.
701, 734 (1986). However, large-scale litigation includes a number of public benefits.
See Patrick A. Luff, Bad Bargains: The Mistake of Allowing Cost-Benefit Analyses in Class
Action Certification Decisions, 41 U. MEM. L. REV. 65, 74 n.36 (2010) [hereinafter Luff,
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certain “procedural contracts are able to sever the tie between compensation and deterrence interests, thus creating a choice for the individual between the public and private interest in litigation.”247 The
most well-known and controversial of these efforts involves contractual
waivers of class and collective relief.248
Waivers of class remedies are, of course, very much at the cutting
edge of U.S. law right now as a result of the recent Supreme Court
decision in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, which upheld a contractual waiver of class remedies that was placed in an arbitration agreement.249 However, that decision failed to address several important
issues regarding the nature of the ability to proceed as a class.250
Although the highly individualistic economic analysis carried out
by the majority suggests that several justices view the ability to proceed
as a class as entirely private in nature, there is no discussion about the
effect private waivers might have on larger regulatory concerns,251
despite a significant amount of commentary cautioning against letting
those with “superior economic power”252 take “unilateral control over
designing a dispute system for conflicts to which [they are] a party”253
and create a form of private dispute resolution that “disserve[s] fundamental social interests—while serving all too well the legal profession’s narrow self-interest.”254 However, some lower federal courts
have stepped into the gap left by the Supreme Court, noting that the
ability to proceed on a collective basis cannot be waived in certain
circumstances, such as those involving the Fair Labor Standards Act
Memphis]; HENSLER ET AL., supra note 113, at 121–22; MULHERON, supra note 9, at 63,
66; Burch, supra note 113, at 74–76
247 Dodge, supra note 228, at 771–72.
248 See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011); see also Strong,
First Principles, supra note 178, at 227-29 (analyzing use of waivers in class arbitration
context).
249 See AT&T Mobility, 131 S. Ct. at 1744, 1753.
250 See Dodge, supra note 228, at 772–83; Strong, Canada, supra note 79, at
965–71; Strong, First Principles, supra note 178, at 211-40 (analyzing whether class
arbitration meets the standards necessary to properly be considered arbitration).
251 See AT&T Mobility, 131 S. Ct. at 1753; Strong, Canada, supra note 79, at
965–71; Strong, First Principles, supra note 178, at 240. The dissent took a more
holistic view of the issues at stake. See AT&T Mobility, 131 S. Ct. at 1760–61 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
252 Lisa Blomgren Bingham et al., Dispute System Design and Justice in Employment
Dispute Resolution: Mediation in the Workplace, 14 HARV. NEG. L. REV. 1, 17 (2009).
253 Bingham et al., supra note 252, at 5; see also Amy J. Cohen, Dispute Systems
Design, Neoliberalism, and the Problem of Scale, 14 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 51, 80 (2009).
254 Richard A. Posner, The Summary Jury Trial and Other Methods of Alternative Dispute Resolution: Some Cautionary Observations, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 366, 368 (1986).
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(FLSA), since collective relief provisions “are integral to [that statute’s] function and structure.”255
When considering waivers of class and collective relief, it is useful
to reflect on the possible ramifications of a decision to allow private
re-ordering of regulatory procedures in jurisdictions that use bottomup regulatory litigation as an integral part of their regulatory systems.256 Four basic outcomes appear possible.
First, the widespread limitation or elimination of the right to proceed as a class or collective could lead to public actors being required
to increase public enforcement of various laws at a rate equal to the
amount of private enforcement that has been lost through the use of
waivers or similar devices.257 This alternative could have a potentially
significant effect on the public purse, since public entities that engage
in regulatory litigation will need more resources to produce higher
levels of performance.258 If waivers occur infrequently or are analyzed
on an individual, case-by-case basis, this additional burden on public
agencies may seem negligible. If, however, the use of class waivers
becomes routine or widespread, either generally or within a specific
industry, then the cost of replacing private enforcement with public
enforcement could be substantial.259 Furthermore, because public
actors may not be as effective as private actors in regulating some

255 Raniere v. Citigroup Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 294, 310 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); see also
Dodge, supra note 228, at 772–83; Charles L. Knapp, Taking Contracts Private: The
Quiet Revolution in Contract Law, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 761, 796 nn.118–19 (2002) (citing cases regarding waivers). But see LaVoice v. UBS Fin. Serv., Inc., No. 11 Civ.
2308(BSJ)(JLC), 2012 WL 124590, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 13, 2012) (declining to follow
Raniere).
256 The assumption is that the elimination of class or collective remedies will result
in the abandonment of the claims by the private individuals. See Strong, First Principles, supra note 178, at 238 (noting non-certification of a class, mass, or collective
often sounds the “death knell” to such proceedings).
257 See Dodge, supra note 228, at 782.
258 In the United States, these functions are often carried out by the Department
of Justice and state attorneys general, although other enforcement agencies also exist.
See Baer, supra note 9, at 612–25; Luff, supra note 8, at 113–14; Meyer, supra note 9, at
886.
259 See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011); Dodge, supra
note 228, at 782; Christopher R. Drahozal & Peter B. Rutledge, Arbitration Clauses in
Credit Card Agreements: An Empirical Study, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 536, 544, 565
(2012) (noting class waivers are widespread in some types of consumer transactions
but not in others); Glover, supra note 2, at 1165–67 (noting increasing use of waivers
of class arbitration and litigation).
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types of behavior, additional expenditures may be needed in order to
bring public entities up to the necessary standard of competence.260
Second, curtailing the ability to proceed as a class or collective
could lead to public actors being expected to fill the gap left by the
departure of private regulators, even though no additional resources
are provided to the relevant agencies. This scenario would likely lead
to under-deterrence of wrongful behavior, since public bodies cannot
be expected to achieve more results without a concomitant rise in the
amount of resources available to them.261 Although public agencies
in both the United States262 and Europe263 have often had to make do
with very little in the way of resources, shortages in public funding
may increase as the global economy works its way out of the recent
financial crisis.
Third, limitations on the right to proceed as a class or collective
could lead legislative or administrative bodies to increase regulation
ex ante so as to eliminate the need for regulatory litigation ex post.264
While the regulations in question could simply reflect more or more
detailed provisions of the same types that are now in place, the
changes could also be different in kind.265 Thus, for example, private
regulatory remedies relating to mass torts could be replaced by criminal liability for individual and corporate tortfeasors266 or by social
260 See Glover, supra note 2, at 1153–55; see also infra notes 276–281 and accompanying text (analyzing limitations on public bodies).
261 See Glover, supra note 2, at 1153; see also Dodge, supra note 228, at 782.
262 See Glover, supra note 2, at 1154 (noting scarce public resources have long
been “the rule, not the exception” in the United States); see also Catherine R. Albiston
& Laura Beth Nielsen, The Procedural Attack on Civil Rights: The Empirical Reality of
Buckhannon for the Private Attorney General, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1087, 1132–34 (2007)
(predicting the aftermath of Buckhannon will reduce private enforcement efforts and
acknowledging it is “unlikely that there will be an infusion of funds into state and
federal enforcement to fill the breach”); Eloise Pasachoff, Special Education, Poverty,
and the Limits of Private Enforcement, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1413, 1415–16 (2011)
(noting “more public enforcement is actually necessary to effectuate the goals of a
statute,” as evidence suggests an overreliance on private action results in “underenforcement of the law”); Heidi Mandanis Schooner, Private Enforcement of Systemic
Risk Regulation, 43 CREIGHTON L. REV. 993, 1000–04 (2010) (acknowledging the limits
of public enforcement).
263 See Bignami, supra note 5, at 412.
264 See Burch, supra note 113, at 70–77, 128; Luff, supra note 8, at 113–14; Robertson, supra note 140, at 162, 175.
265 See Burch, supra note 113, at 70–77, 128; Strong, Canada, supra note 79, at 980.
266 See Richard A. Nagareda, Outrageous Fortune and the Criminalization of Mass Torts,
96 MICH. L. REV. 1121, 1197–98 (1998); Byron G. Stier, PIP Breast Implants and Mass
Torts in Europe, MASS TORT LITIGATION BLOG (Jan. 30, 2012), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/mass_tort_litigation/2012/01/pip-breast-implants-and-mass-tortsin-europe.html [hereinafter PIP Breast Implants] (describing the traditional European
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insurance programs that eliminate the need for wrongdoers to pay
compensatory damages.267
Fourth, elimination of the right to proceed as a class or collective
could inspire legislators to reinstate private forms of group relief at
previously existing levels, effectively superseding any judicial decisions
permitting private waiver of class or other types of regulatory remedies.268 Regulatory litigation often involves this kind of iterative process wherein the legislature and judiciary mutually monitor each
other’s actions, so it would not be surprising to see some form of legislative action in response to certain types of judicial decisions.269
Indeed, such efforts have already been seen in the wake of the U.S.
Supreme Court decision in AT&T Mobility.270
Given these alternatives, some critics may find regulatory litigation less problematic than they originally believed.271 Furthermore,
these kinds of analyses demonstrate the importance of considering
regulatory litigation holistically, as a matter of institutional design,
rather than simply evaluating the device on an individualistic basis,
devoid of context.272
2. Specific Needs Giving Rise to Regulatory Litigation
Given the benefits of a contextual analysis, it is perhaps unsurprising that the next step of this discussion puts bottom-up regulatory litigation into a practical, functional framework by identifying the types
of situations where such litigation might be most necessary and approapproach as “more reliant on criminal law than tort for deterrence, compensatory
damages are limited because of the comparatively extensive governmental social
insurance, punitive damages are unavailable, and class actions are traditionally not
embraced.”). See generally Frank J. Vandall, The Criminalization of Products Liability: An
Invitation to Political Abuse, Preemption, and Non-Enforcement, 57 CATH. U. L. REV. 341
(2008) (arguing the criminalization of products liability is “neither necessary, nor
desirable.”).
267 See Burch, supra note 113, at 70–77, 128; Jules L. Coleman, Mistakes, Misunderstandings, and Misalignments, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 541, 564–65 (2012), available at
http://yalelawjournal.org/the-yale-law-journal-pocket-part/tort-law/mistakes,-misunderstandings,-and-misalignments/; Stier, supra note 266.
268 See Greenberg, supra note 124, at 585–86; Ventoruzzo, supra note 72, at 439.
269 Id.; see also supra notes 208–209 and accompanying text (describing the interaction of legislatures and courts with regards to regulatory litigation).
270 See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011); Arbitration Fairness Act of 2011, S. 987, 112th Cong. (2011); Arbitration Fairness Act of 2011, H.R.
1873, 112th Cong. (2011).
271 See Burch, supra note 113, at 70–77, 128; Strong, Canada, supra note 79, at 980.
272 See Dodge, supra note 228, at 729 (noting dangers of uncontextualized procedural analysis); Matthew C. Stephenson, Public Regulation of Private Enforcement: The
Case for Expanding the Role of Administrative Agencies, 91 VA. L. REV. 93, 106–21 (2005).
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priate. Previous analysis of this issue has been somewhat unsatisfactory, as demonstrated by suggestions that litigation might be
considered “regulatory by virtue of the number of participants, [or]
the size or nature of the remedy.”273 The problem with that approach
is that it could be used to argue that all forms of large-scale litigation
should be considered regulatory, thus reducing the analysis about the
situations in which regulatory litigation is most appropriate to a simple inquiry as to the circumstances in which class or collective redress
is permitted as a matter of national law. However, this methodology
cannot be correct, since not every form of class or collective relief is
regulatory in nature.274
Therefore, other factors must be considered. Since regulatory litigation arises as a “stopgap . . . to protect individual citizens from
risk,”275 the most appropriate inquiry would be to identify how best to
identify and address unanticipated risk from a functional perspective.276 As it turns out, there are three instances when regulatory litigation might be particularly appropriate as a matter of institutional
design.
a. Limitations on Public Bodies
First, regulatory litigation may be necessary in cases where “limitations on public bodies . . . circumscribe their effectiveness in achieving regulatory goals.”277 Because public regulators are unable to
achieve anticipated or optimal levels of enforcement on their own,
class or collective relief can act as a supplement to public enforcement
mechanisms.278
Public entities can experience various types of limitations,
although the most obvious is underfunding.279 Scarce public
resources have long been “the rule, not the exception,”280 in the
United States, which may be one reason why class actions have
become so prevalent in the U.S. However, European institutions also
273 Luff, supra note 8, at 88 (footnote omitted).
274 See MULHERON, supra note 9, at 63–66; see also supra notes 172–86 and accompanying text (discussing types of large-scale litigation available in the United States).
275 Luff, supra note 8, at 114; see also id. at 75.
276 See supra Part III.A.
277 Glover, supra note 2, at 1153.
278 See id. at 1140, 1145–46.
279 See id. at 1153 (discussing situations where “public governmental enforcement
bodies have limited resources that are . . . insufficient to perform the functions with
which they are tasked”).
280 Id. at 1154; see Albiston & Nielsen, supra note 262, at 1132–34; Pasachoff, supra
note 262, at 1415–16; Schooner, supra note 262, at 1000–04.
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appear to be increasingly “overtaxed and under-resourced,” suggesting that a need for regulatory litigation may be on the rise in the
European Union.281 This need for private means of enforcement in
Europe may increase further as a result of the recent financial crisis.
While it would be premature to suggest that there is a causal connection between the increase in collective redress in the European Union
over the last ten years and the recent challenges in public funding,
such a conclusion makes some intuitive sense.282
b. Informational Disadvantages
Second, regulatory litigation may be necessary in situations where
public authorities suffer from “informational disadvantages” in comparison to private citizens.283 Informational asymmetries can arise in
a variety of ways. For example, the tendency toward “public underinvestment in information” can result in agencies holding sub-optimal
levels of information.284
As a result, “the best sources of information about private wrongs
are often the parties themselves.”285 This may be particularly true in
cases where regulatory bodies are geographically distant from the
place of legal injury, since that “not only limits their ability to access or
be accessed by those who suffered alleged harm but also reduces their
ability to even know that such harm occurred in the first place.”286
Problems could also arise in situations where the regulatory body is
particularly large or politically decentralized, as might occur in the
multi-tiered structure found in the European Union.287 In such circumstances, private forms of regulation, including class or collective
suits, might provide a better means of addressing the legal injury.288
Access to information may vary according to the type of injury at
issue. Thus, for example, individual employees may be better placed
than public regulators to identify violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act, since employees “will usually have the best information
281 Bignami, supra note 5, at 412 (claiming, however, that has not led to regulatory
litigation but to “cooperative legalism”).
282 See Directorate General, supra note 19, at 38.
283 Glover, supra note 2, at 1154.
284 See Matthew C. Stephenson, Information Acquisition and Institutional Design, 124
HARV. L. REV. 1422, 1431 (2011).
285 Glover, supra note 2, at 1154.
286 Id. at 1154–55.
287 See Abigail C. Moncrieff, Cost-Benefit Federalism: Reconciling Collective Action Federalism and Libertarian Federalism in the Obamacare Litigation and Beyond, 38 AM. J. L. &
MED. 288, 304–05 (2012) (noting size affects informational asymmetries).
288 See Glover, supra note 2, at 1155.
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regarding underpayment of wages or nonpayment of overtime.”289
However, unlawful behavior in the realm of consumer finance may
not be as obvious to individual users “who are looking at a single
credit card statement” and therefore are less able to identify “practices
like predatory lending or the charging of usurious interest rates.”290
Private individuals’ access to information may also depend on
certain background principles of law that exist outside the regulatory
scheme.291 For example, litigants in U.S. courts can obtain a great
deal of information from both parties and third parties through the
discovery process.292 Although judicial discovery was not created with
regulatory litigation in mind, the device can be used to facilitate private enforcement of public laws in the United States.293
The situation is very different in the European Union. Not only
is the scope of discovery in litigation much narrower (to the extent
the concept of pre-trial production of documents and information
even exists), but most litigants are required to have their evidence in
hand prior to filing their lawsuits.294 Because private individuals
based in the European Union have far less access to information as a
result of the litigation process, they may be unable to utilize regulatory litigation as effectively as parties suing in U.S. courts.295 Notably,
the Resolution has already recommended against the adoption of any
289 Id. at 1184; see Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-718, ch. 676,
§ 16, 52 Stat. 1060, 1069 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 216 (2006)). This would support the
decision not to allow parties to waive their rights to collective action in Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA) suits. See Raniere v. Citigroup Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 294, 314
(S.D.N.Y. 2011) (holding the right to proceed collectively under the FLSA cannot be
waived).
290 Glover, supra note 2, at 1182.
291 See supra notes 169–170 and accompanying text.
292 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26; Stephenson, supra note 284, at 1428–29, 1447–53 (considering judicial informational disadvantages). Generous rules regarding notice
pleading eliminate the need for plaintiffs to have evidence of their allegations at the
time of filing, although recent Supreme Court decisions have tightened the pleading
standard in the United States. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombley, 550 U.S. 544, 556
(2007); Scott Dodson & James M. Klebba, Global Civil Procedure Trends in the TwentyFirst Century, 34 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 3–8 (2011) (comparing pleading standards inside and outside the U.S.).
293 See Nagareda, supra note 10, at 13.
294 See Dodson & Klebba, supra note 292, at 7–8. Of all the European Member
States, only England recognizes a right to discovery similar to that used in the U.S.,
although even then, the scope of disclosure is construed much more narrowly than in
the United States. See S.I. Strong, Jurisdictional Discovery in United States Federal Courts,
67 WASH. & LEE L. Rev. 489, 501–03, 522–23 (2010).
295 See Nagareda, supra note 10, at 2.
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special measures that might increase access to evidence in cases involving cross-border collective redress, stating that:
[C]ollective claimants must not be in a better position than individual claimants with regard to access to evidence from the defendant,
and each claimant must provide evidence for his claim; an obligation to disclose documents to the claimants (“discovery”) is mostly
unknown in Europe and must not form part of the horizontal
framework.296

c. Capture
Third, private forms of relief may be necessary in cases where
“public regulatory bodies are potentially subject to capture by wellcapitalized or politically influential interest groups.”297 While the
compromises necessary in the political process suggest that no one
interest group will ever entirely capture a particular agency, “the disproportionate influence of well-organized interest groups is disturbing” to a number of commentators in the field.298 Certainly
industry groups were seen to have asserted a great deal of political
pressure on the question of collective redress in Europe during the
public consultation process undertaken by the European Commission
prior to the adoption of the Resolution.299
Interestingly, some public choice theorists suggest that courts are
now subject to the same concerns about “capture” of special interests
as other public institutions.300 This phenomenon may perhaps be
most apparent in cases heard in the U.S. Supreme Court, given that
many of the same interest groups that are active in legislative lobbying
296 Resolution, supra note 20, ¶ 20.
297 Glover, supra note 2, at 1155.
298 Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial Review?,
101 YALE L.J. 31, 43 (1991); see Glover, supra note 2, at 1204.
299 See Public Consultation: Towards a Coherent European Approach to Collective Redress,
EUROPEAN COMMISSION, DIRECTORATE-GENERAL JUSTICE, http://ec.europa.eu/justice/
news/consulting_public/news_consulting_0054_en.htm (last visited Oct. 6, 2012)
(containing approximately 19,000 submissions made as part of the European Commission’s public consultation on collective redress); Valguarnera, supra note 19, at
1–2.
300 See Frank B. Cross, Shattering the Fragile Case for Judicial Review of Rulemaking, 85
VA. L. REV. 1243, 1322–23 (1999); Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts:
1967–1983, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1039, 1069 (1997). But see Andrew P. Morriss &
Craig Allen Nard, Institutional Choice & Interest Groups in the Development of American
Patent Law, 19 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 143, 217–18 (2011) (arguing “courts and Congress
each present interest groups with different costs and benefits,” and in certain conditions seeking a federal court opinion is “significantly less” costly than lobbying Congress for a statutory change).
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now undertake judicial “lobbying” through use of the amicus
process.301
Nevertheless, many commentators take the view that regulatory
litigation is preferred over more traditional means of regulation precisely because judges are not subject to capture.302 Other observers
go even further, suggesting that class and collective relief expands
democratic opportunities because “class actions may increase the
political expression of larger groups” that are disadvantaged during
the traditional lobbying and legislative process.303 Other experts suggest that “the threat of private actions can increase the expected
probability that a punishment will be imposed relative to a purely public regime.”304
Focusing the regulatory analysis on functionally based criteria
such as the availability of resources, informational advantages, and the
possibility of capture provides useful benefits to lawmakers in both the
United States and Europe.305 Not only do these types of operational
considerations provide useful information for states considering the
role of bottom-up regulatory litigation in their own domestic systems,
they constitute a neutral means of comparing the usefulness of regulatory litigation across jurisdictional lines.306 Therefore, as the European Union works to develop its coherent approach to cross-border
collective redress, drafting authorities should be aware of the potentially heightened need for regulatory litigation in situations where
state actors are either unwilling (because of capture) or unable
(because of insufficient resources or informational disadvantages) to
engage in public forms of regulatory litigation.307 However, it
301 See Richard J. Lazarus, Advocacy Matters Before and Within the Supreme Court:
Transforming the Court by Transforming the Bar, 96 GEO. L.J. 1487, 1490–91, 1505–07
(2008) (discussing the strategy and success rate of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, a
non-profit advocacy group formed by corporate interests to promote a pro-business
agenda at the Supreme Court).
302 See Eric A. Posner, Tobacco Regulation or Litigation?, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1141,
1155–57 (2003); see also Cassone & Ramello, supra note 86, at 223 (suggesting that
that “[c]lass action can thus re-establish the alignment between public and individual
interests where there are no credible alternatives”).
303 Sophie Harnay & Alain Marciano, Seeking Rents Through Class Actions and Legislative Lobbying: A Comparison, 32 EUR. J.L. & ECON. 293, 303 (2011).
304 Reza Rajabiun, Private Enforcement and Judicial Discretion in the Evolution of Antitrust in the United States, 8 J. COMP. L. & ECON. 187, 200 (2012).
305 See Michaels, supra note 40, at 342, 357.
306 See id.
307 When public bodies fail to provide a sufficient level of regulation through
traditional or litigation-oriented means, the levels of legal injury will rise. If private
forms of bilateral litigation are not enough to address the injuries in question
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remains to be seen whether the procedures proposed in the Resolution are likely to result in some form of regulatory litigation.308 This
issue is considered in the next Part.309
IV.

REGULATORY LITIGATION

IN

EUROPE

A. Current Forms of Regulatory Litigation
Applying the analysis outlined in Part III to issues of European
law, it appears likely that the European Union has already adopted a
top-down form of regulatory litigation, which “allows the government
to address risks that have already come to pass.”310 Indeed, the European regulation on passengers’ rights seems to fall firmly within the
definition of this type of procedure.311
The more difficult question is whether the European Union has
adopted or is adopting a form of bottom-up regulatory litigation as a
result of its coherent European plan for cross-border collective
relief.312 This is an intriguing question, for although there is some
evidence suggesting that European authorities consider some of the
individual Member States’ existing collective redress schemes to be
regulatory in nature,313 there has been little public discussion thus far
about whether and to what extent European authorities intend or
expect the new inter-European form of collective redress to do the
same.314
(because of unanticipated procedural risks), then regulatory litigation may be appropriate. See supra notes 202–206 and accompanying text.
308 See Resolution, supra note 20. Although some commentators take the view that
regulatory litigation requires intent on the part of the litigants or judge, it is also
possible to achieve an unintended regulatory effect. See Dari-Mattiacci & De Geest,
supra note 37, at 377; Luff, supra note 8, at 113; Russell, supra note 34, at 151 n.47.
309 See infra Part IV.
310 Luff, supra note 8, at 113.
311 See Regulation on Passengers’ Rights, supra note 142; see also supra notes
142–144 and accompanying text (exploring European regulation of passenger rights
as an example of top-down regulatory litigation).
312 See Resolution, supra note 20; Luff, supra note 8, at 113.
313 See Directorate General, supra note 19, at 6 (stating that “[m]arket outcomes
may be efficiently corrected by government or courts provided that access information and organisation are facilitated and kept at minimum cost to avoid creating
externalities” (emphasis omitted)); see also id. at 7 (suggesting that “[a]nother
response to market failure or government failure may be judicial intervention”).
314 For example, the European Parliament’s own-initiative report is somewhat
ambiguous in this regard. See Lehne Report, supra note 21, ¶ 4 (“[A]ction is needed
at EU level in order to improve the current EU regulatory framework so as to allow
victims of infringements of EU law to be compensated for the damage they sustain
and thus contribute to consumer confidence and smoother functioning of the inter-
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While commentators have considered the issue, their opinions
are somewhat inconsistent. For example, some observers believe:
that European regulatory styles are converging, but not on a system
of adversarial legalism, as the Americanization literature suggests.
Rather, European systems are converging on a regulatory process
that combines tough, legalistic administrative enforcement of government rules, extensive public pressure on industry actors to selfregulate, and low levels of litigation . . . .315

Other experts take the view that some European forms of collective redress “comprise[ ] claims that are essentially regulatory in character, enabling collective action to defend the collective rights of
consumers in specified circumstances.”316
One reason for these differing perspectives may relate to the fact
that the law on the books does not necessarily reflect the law in practice.317 Although there are numerous pieces of European legislation
providing for collective redress,318 those devices are neither well
known nor well used.319 Therefore, a formalist analysis might suggest
one level of support for bottom-up regulatory litigation while a functional analysis showed another.320
While it would be possible to conduct a retrospective review of
the various types of collective redress that are currently available
under European law to determine whether any of those devices constitute bottom-up regulatory litigation, that exercise seems somewhat
futile in light of the scale of reform proposed by the Resolution.321
Therefore, the following analysis focuses on whether and to what
extent the Resolution contemplates the creation of a bottom-up form
nal market.”); see also id. ¶ 9 (noting “that there are gaps in the existing regulatory
framework” and stressing “the added value of a coherent EU action for the establishment of a common framework in the field of collective redress to address the shortcomings and lack of effectiveness of the existing EU legal instruments, the diversity of
situations at national level, the potential evolution and reforms of existing national
collective redress systems or the introduction of collective redress systems in Member
States where such instruments do not yet exist”). However, it may be that the European Commission will undertake a full regulatory analysis in its forthcoming impact
report. See Resolution, supra note 20, ¶ 4.
315 Bignami, supra note 5, at 412 (referring to the new European style as “cooperative legalism”).
316 Hodges, Europeanization, supra note 35, at 115.
317 See Michaels, supra note 40, at 342 (discussing methodology of functionalism).
318 See supra note 20.
319 See Resolution, supra note 20, ¶ G.
320 See Michaels, supra note 40, at 342.
321 See Resolution, supra note 20; see also supra note 17 (listing forms of collective
redress).
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of regulatory litigation, based on two separate factors: the enunciated
purposes of the Resolution and the proposed procedures.322 The first
of these elements will identify any regulatory effects that are intended
by the European Parliament while the second will pinpoint any unintended regulatory effects as well as the extent to which the proposed
procedures are likely to fulfill the European Parliament’s stated
objectives.323
B. The Resolution—Enunciated Purposes
1. Compensatory and Efficiency-Related Rationales
On first glance, the Resolution might appear to be more concerned with compensation and efficiency than with regulation, based
on statements indicating that “victims of unlawful practices – citizens
and companies alike – must be able to claim compensation for their
individual loss or damage suffered, in particular in the case of scattered and dispersed damages, where the cost risk might not be proportionate to the damages suffered.”324 Other provisions state that
“bundling claims in a single collective redress procedure, or allowing
such a claim to be brought by a representative entity or body acting in
the public interest, could simplify the process and reduce costs for the
parties involved.”325 Similar language notes that while “public
enforcement is essential to implement the provisions of the Treaties, . . . fully achieve the goals of the EU and . . . ensure the enforcement of EU competition law,”326 “public enforcement to stop
infringements and impose fines does not of itself enable consumers to
be compensated for damage suffered.”327
322 See Resolution, supra note 20.
323 Although the type of intent necessary for bottom-up regulatory litigation
involves that of the judge or the litigants rather than that of the legislature or executive, it is nevertheless useful to consider whether and to what extent European authorities appear to be contemplating the use of regulatory litigation as a matter of
institutional design. See Luff, supra note 8, at 113–14; see also Strong, Regulatory Arbitration, supra note 150 (discussing legislative intent in regulatory litigation and
arbitration).
324 Resolution, supra note 20, ¶ 1; see also id. ¶ E (noting collective redress is
appropriate because individual consumers “often face significant barriers in terms of
accessibility, effectiveness and affordability owing to sometimes high litigation costs,
potential psychological costs, complex and lengthy procedures, and lack of information on the available means of redress”).
325 Id. ¶ K; see also id. ¶¶ 20, 22 (regarding representative bodies).
326 Id. ¶ 6.
327 Id. ¶ J.
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These statements clearly indicate that the European Parliament is
promoting a form of cross-border collective redress because such measures constitute an effective means of addressing certain types of
large-scale legal injuries.328 In so doing, the European Parliament
upholds the principles enunciated in national, international, and
European law requiring parties to have recourse to an effective remedy.329 However, the right to an effective remedy can be justified on
both regulatory and non-regulatory grounds.330 Therefore, the mere
adoption of collective procedures as a means of providing an effective
remedy does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the collective
mechanisms proposed in the Resolution are meant to operate as a
form of bottom-up regulation.331 More must be shown before that
conclusion can be reached.
2. Public Regulatory Rationales
A second set of statements found in the Resolution are regulatory
in nature, but only to the extent that those provisions are meant to
establish a legal or factual justification for European intervention (i.e.,
regulation) in the area of cross-border collective redress.332 Rather
than describing how collective redress might provide some type of regulatory effect, these statements discuss issues such as the principles of
subsidiarity and proportionality (which identify the legal parameters
within which European authorities must act),333 “the integration of
European markets,”334 and the fragmented and incomplete nature of
national and European legislation concerning collective redress.335
Because these references are meant only to demonstrate that
European authorities are acting in a manner that is consistent with
their powers under the relevant treaties, it is not surprising that these
328 See id. ¶¶ E, J–K, 1, 6, 20, 22.
329 See supra notes 242–45 and accompanying text.
330 See supra notes 242–245 and accompanying text. Furthermore, a particular
mechanism can simultaneously fulfill compensatory and regulatory aims; there is no
need for one function to exclude the other. See HENSLER ET AL., supra note 113, at
121–22; MULHERON, supra note 9, at 63, 66; Burch, supra note 113, at 74–76; Luff,
Memphis, supra note 246, at 74.
331 See supra notes 187–88 and accompanying text.
332 See Resolution, supra note 20, ¶¶ H–J, 4, 6. The Resolution also notes that
seventy-nine percent of European consumers support the adoption of a collective
redress mechanism. See id. ¶ D.
333 Id. ¶¶ M, 4. European authorities are only authorized to act in certain areas as
a matter of fundamental European law. One such area of competence involves the
operation of the internal market. See TFEU, supra note 38, arts. 3, 5.
334 Resolution, supra note 20, ¶ H; see also id. ¶¶ I–J, 4, 6.
335 See id. ¶¶ H–I, L, 15.
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provisions do not appear sufficient to suggest that the Resolution is
introducing a form of bottom-up regulatory litigation into European
law.336 Instead, the necessary language must be found elsewhere.
3. Private Regulatory Rationales
As it turns out, there is a third set of statements that appears to
suggest that the European Union is intending to adopt a form of bottom-up regulatory litigation as a matter of institutional design. For
example, at one point the Resolution indicates that “in some Member
States the overall performance of the existing consumer redress and
enforcement tools designed at EU level is not deemed satisfactory, or
such mechanisms are not sufficiently well known, which results in
their limited use.”337 This reference to “enforcement tools” appears
to indicate that something more than mere compensation or efficiency is at work.338 Indeed, that statement seems to suggest that private litigation is being used to enforce public laws, either through
statutory design (as in top-down regulatory litigation) or through the
provision of remedies (as in bottom-up regulatory litigation).339
Additional evidence of regulatory intent is seen in statements that
“when a group of citizens are victims of the same infringement, individual lawsuits may not constitute an effective means of stopping
unlawful practices or obtaining compensation, in particular if the
individual loss is small in comparison with the litigation costs.”340
While this language mentions compensatory and efficiency-oriented
aims, the reference to “stopping unlawful practices” appears to suggest a desire to deter certain types of future behavior.341 This suggests
the intention to manage risk through litigation, a hallmark of regulatory litigation.342
Finally, and perhaps most conclusively, the Resolution indicates
that “national and European authorities play a pivotal role in the
enforcement of EU law, and private enforcement should only supplement, but not replace, public enforcement.”343 Additional language
336 See id. ¶¶ D, H–J, L, 4, 6, 15; Luff, supra note 8, at 75, 113–14.
337 Resolution, supra note 20, ¶ G; see also id. ¶ 3 (welcoming the “efforts of Member States to strengthen the rights of victims of unlawful behavior by introducing or
planning to introduce legislation aimed at facilitating redress”).
338 Id. ¶ G.
339 See Luff, supra note 8, at 113–14.
340 Resolution, supra note 20, ¶ F.
341 Id.
342 Luff, supra note 8, at 113.
343 Resolution, supra note 20, ¶ I.
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mentions the “need to improve injunctive relief remedies”344 so as to
protect “both the individual interest and the public interest.”345
These references to the public interest and the role of private litigation as a supplement to public means of regulatory enforcement again
suggest an intention to adopt regulatory litigation as a matter of institutional design, since those two elements are central to the common
understanding of regulatory litigation.346 Therefore, the Resolution
appears to reflect a clear and significant shift away from the traditional perception that European jurisdictions do not engage in regulatory litigation.347
C. The Resolution—Proposed Procedures
One of the aims of this Article is to determine whether and to
what extent the procedures outlined in the Resolution will allow an
effective form of regulatory litigation to develop in the European
Union.348 Full analysis of this issue is impossible, since the Resolution
does not describe the final procedures that will be used to create a
coherent European approach to cross-border collective redress.349
However, the European Parliament has made a number of preliminary suggestions in this regard, and it is possible and indeed helpful to
evaluate the efficacy of these initial proposals, since that will provide
practical assistance to European authorities charged with creating a
final set of procedures.350
Although the European Union, as a second-generation user of
collective redress mechanisms, is perfectly placed to learn from the
344 Id. ¶ 12.
345 Id. ¶ 13; see also id. ¶ 23 (regarding injunctive relief).
346 See Glover, supra note 2, at 1140, 1145–46.
347 See Resolution, supra note 20; see also supra note 3 and accompanying text (noting the perception that European nations prefer formal to private regulation).
348 See Resolution, supra note 20; see also supra note 33 and accompanying text.
349 Instead, the European Parliament has asked the European Commission to conduct an impact assessment that demonstrates “action is needed at EU level in order to
improve the current EU regulatory framework so as to allow victims of infringements
of EU law to be compensated for the damage they sustain and thus contribute to
consumer confidence and smoother functioning of the internal market.” Resolution,
supra note 20, ¶ 4; see also TFEU, supra note 38, art. 294 (detailing the ordinary legislative procedure); Resolution, supra note 20, ¶ 29 (indicating “that the European
Parliament must be involved . . . in any legislative initiative in the field of collective
redress”).
350 The European legislative process is still in the very early stages of development,
with a significant amount of opportunity for future development. See Resolution,
supra note 20, ¶ 29; see also TFEU, supra note 38, art. 294 (outlining the ordinary
legislative procedure).
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mistakes from other legal systems, it is possible to overcompensate for
the errors of others.351 Indeed, this may be what is happening in the
European Union, since it quickly becomes apparent that the Resolution’s approach to cross-border collective redress is more reactive
than proactive, with the clear intention being “that Europe must
refrain from introducing a US-style class action system or any system
which does not respect European legal traditions.”352 Not only are
many of the procedures framed in negative, rather than positive,
terms, but the document focuses almost entirely on issues that are
hotly debated in the United States rather than on developments that
arise under the law of the European Union or the individual Member
States.353
The Resolution’s procedural proposals include several different
elements.354 First and foremost, the European Parliament indicates
that “the European approach to collective redress must be founded
on the opt-in principle,” a feature that clearly renounces U.S.-style
opt-out class actions.355 Other facets of the Resolution also demonstrate a rejection of U.S. principles and the abusive litigation culture
that is commonly associated with the U.S. approach to mass claims.356
Therefore, the Resolution requires members of the collective to be
identified prior to the bringing of the claim, creates a procedure to
allow a judge to conduct a preliminary analysis on admissibility, and
allows for retention of the individual right to assert one’s claim.357
Concerns about background principles of American law are also
351 See Francis E. McGovern, Second-Generation Dispute System Design Issues in Managing Settlements, 24 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 53, 53 (2008) (“Second-generation
learning can benefit as much from understanding why designs fail as it can from
understanding why they succeed.”).
352 Resolution, supra note 20, ¶ 2; see also id. ¶ 9 (citing evidence that “collective
redress mechanisms available within the EU have not generated disproportionate economic consequences”); Directorate General, supra note 19, at 9 (concerning
benchmarks regarding collective redress mechanisms).
353 See Resolution, supra note 20, ¶ 20; see supra notes 14, 34 and accompanying
text.
354 See Resolution, supra note 20.
355 Id. ¶ 20.
356 See id. ¶ 2; see also Bignami, supra note 5, at 460 (noting European nations have
resisted Americanization and tended towards a model of cooperative legalism);
Hodges, Europeanization, supra note 35, at 115; Valguarnera, supra note 19, at 3,
19–21 (comparing the manner in which American and European market regulation
impacts the legal system and propensity for litigation).
357 See Resolution, supra note 20, ¶ 20. The emphasis on the need to protect the
individual right to assert one’s claim is particularly interesting because of certain difficulties involving European rules of civil procedure. See Strong, Brussels I, supra note
30; Strong, Quo Vadis, supra note 34.
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apparent in prohibitions on contingency fees, production of documents (discovery), and punitive damages.358 The Resolution also
rejects the U.S. procedural approach to attorneys’ fees by explicitly
retaining the European-derived loser-pays principle.359
This is not to say that the Resolution does not include some elements that are reminiscent of U.S.-style class actions.360 For example,
the Resolution recommends that any future form of cross-border collective redress operate on a horizontal, rather than sectoral (subjectspecific), basis, as has been used by the European Union in the
past.361 While this move makes the proposed procedures more similar
to the trans-substantive approach embodied in Rule 23 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, the shift is considered appropriate because
“collective redress mechanisms available within the EU have not generated disproportionate economic consequences.”362 This decision to
adopt a horizontal approach is consistent with the example set by
other legal systems that have expanded the availability of class or collective redress after an initially positive experience.363
European authorities are in a difficult position because “Europe
seeks to strike a precarious balance—to facilitate the closure of
related civil claims in the aggregate but, at the same time, not to
‘enable’ litigation.”364 Numerous commentators have suggested that
the European desire to avoid an abusive litigation culture could lead
European authorities to design a system of collective redress that is so

358 See Resolution, supra note 20, ¶ 20. Many of the more abusive aspects of U.S.
class actions do not arise as a result of the nature of class action procedures themselves but because of the interaction between those procedures and background principles of U.S. civil procedure. See Nagareda, supra note 10, at 2; Strong, Mass Torts,
supra note 78.
359 See Resolution, supra note 20, ¶ 20 (stating “there can be no action without
financial risk”).
360 See id.
361 See id. ¶¶ 1, 15–24, 26; see also supra note 20.
362 Resolution, supra note 20, ¶ 9; see FED. R. CIV. P. 23. Some types of class or
collective relief are available in the United States on a sectoral basis. See Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §216 (2006).
363 See Hensler, supra note 15, at 15.
364 Nagareda, supra note 10, at 28; see also Hensler, supra note 15, at 22–25 (noting
the need to balance incentives for group action against concerns about abusive litigation). However, “even the stated resistance to the ‘litigation culture’ of the United
States on the part of European systems will not—indeed, cannot—immunize Europe
from the kinds of structural dynamics exhibited by U.S.-style aggregate litigation.”
Nagareda, supra note 10, at 8. See also infra note 405 and accompanying text.
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restrictive it curtails the effectiveness of large-scale litigation as a regulatory and compensatory device.365
Problems arise with respect to several of the proposed procedures, beginning with the recommendation that European authorities
adopt an opt-in, rather than an opt-out, mechanism.366 This choice
was driven by a number of factors, not the least of which was the fact
that opt-out procedures are considered constitutionally suspect in several European Member States.367
While this decision is a perfectly legitimate exercise of public policy, the functional ramifications cannot be ignored. For example, optin procedures tend to result in smaller groups than opt-out procedures, thereby reducing the deterrent (i.e., regulatory) effect of the
device in question.368 Although the number of plaintiffs is related to
some extent to the preferred default principle (i.e., whether plaintiff
inaction should work to increase or decrease class size), opt-in actions’
smaller size is also the result of certain logistical difficulties associated
with creating an opt-in class.369 European authorities developing the
new cross-border collective redress mechanism need to be aware of
these sorts of pragmatic concerns and, if necessary, address them so as
ensure that any procedures that are adopted provide the desired regulatory effect free from any unintended distortions.370
365 See Hensler, supra note 15, at 22–23; Mulheron, Opt-Out, supra note 27, at
452–53; Sarah A. Westby, Note, Associations to the Rescue: Reviving the Consumer Class
Action in the United States and Italy, 20 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 157, 195–96
(2011).
366 See Resolution, supra note 20, ¶ 20.
367 The problem is that opt-out procedures do not provide adequate assurance for
some countries that all plaintiffs have consciously chosen to exercise their individual
litigation rights in this way and at this time. See In re Vivendi Universal, No. 02 Civ.
5571(RJH)(HBP), 2009 WL 855799, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2009); Buxbaum, Securities, supra note 10, at 32–34; Monestier, supra note 11, at 38–39; Strong, Quo Vadis,
supra note 34.
368 See Hensler, supra note 15, at 22–23; Mulheron, Opt-Out, supra note 27, at
452–53; Westby, supra note 365, at 195–96.
369 See Mulheron, Opt-Out, supra note 27, at 452–53. For example, “[o]pt-in systems could be burdensome and cost-intensive for consumer organisations which have
to do preparatory work such as identifying consumers, establishing the facts of each
case, as well as running the case and communicating with each plaintiff.” Green
Paper on Consumer Collective Redress, supra note 20, ¶¶ 55–56; see also Mulheron,
Opt-Out, supra note 27, at 451 (advocating for an opt-out alternative to effectuate
collective redress within the European Member States).
370 See Mulheron, Opt-Out, supra note 27, at 452–53; see also supra notes 241–45
and accompanying text (discussing the procedural justice and efficacy of remedies in
class claims).
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A second potential problem involves the Resolution’s prohibition
on punitive and exemplary damages.371 This provision is also based
on constitutional concerns expressed by various Member States, in
this case, regarding the way in which punitive damages blend private
and public (i.e., criminal law) concerns.372 Again, the decision to
exclude punitive damages is entirely appropriate from a public policy
perspective. However, numerous commentators have suggested that
caps on damages in large-scale litigation reduce the regulatory value
of class and collective actions, which suggests that European authorities should consider whether the coherent European approach to
cross-border collective redress needs to adopt special mechanisms to
counteract the reduction in regulatory effect caused by the limitation
on damages.373
A third problem area involves funding mechanisms.374 Contingency fees are strongly disfavored in Europe, and although some
Member States allow third party litigation funding to fill this particular gap, the availability of these alternative funding mechanisms varies
from state to state.375 The Resolution takes no position on this issue,
leaving the matter of funding to the individual Member States to
decide.376 While European authorities and individual Member States
are fully entitled to disallow third-party and contingency-fee funding
as a matter of public policy, that decision must be made subject to the
recognition that the absence of any special funding devices “poses
huge challenges for the effective implementation of class actions” and
other collective mechanisms.377 Indeed, some commentators have
concluded that “partial compensation of victims and large profits for
the class counsel, far from being a side-effect [of U.S. class litigation],
371 See Resolution, supra note 20, ¶ 20.
372 See Samuel P. Baumgartner, Class Actions and Group Litigation in Switzerland, 27
NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 301, 310–11 (2007); Antonio Gidi, Class Actions in Brazil—A
Model for Civil Law Countries, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 311, 322, 324 n.22 (2003).
373 See Westby, supra note 365, at 195–96; see also Cassone & Ramello, supra note
86, at 222–23 (discussing the ramifications of class action remedies that only partially
compensate victims); Hensler, supra note 15, at 22–25.
374 See Hensler, supra note 15, at 22–23; Hodges, ANNALS, supra note 20, at 343.
375 See Coffee, supra note 2, at 350–51; Hensler, supra note 15, at 22–23; Marco de
Morpurgo, A Comparative Legal and Economic Approach to Third-Party Litigation Funding,
19 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 343, 360–66 (2011); Robertson, supra note 140, at
161–62.
376 See Resolution, supra note 20, ¶ 20.
377 Hensler, supra note 15, at 23; see also Coffee, supra note 2, at 350–51 (suggesting third party litigation funding is not implausible and “its impact has already
been felt”).
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are actually a necessary condition for reallocation of the costs and
risks associated with the legal action.”378
The fourth and final issue involves fee-shifting provisions. Loserpays rules can limit the ability of class and collective relief to act as a
regulatory agent, since plaintiffs in a large-scale litigation often cannot
afford to pay for respondents’ legal fees and costs and may therefore
decide not to bring the case in the first place.379 As a result, some
jurisdictions mitigate the harsh effect of the loser-pays principle in
cases involving the public interest so as to avoid this chilling effect.380
The Resolution indicates that loser-pay rules should apply in cases
involving cross-border collective redress, but does not discuss how
those principles should be applied and whether any adjustments can
or should be made to soften the effect of the loser-pays rule.381 Again,
this is an issue that European authorities should consider so as to
make sure that the procedures they adopt have the desired regulatory
effect.
D. Dispute Resolution Design Theory in the European Context
When considering how best to structure the European approach
to cross-border collective redress, European authorities should take
advantage of recent advances in dispute system design (DSD) theory
so as to create “an effective, efficient, and fair dispute resolution process based upon the unique needs of a particular system.”382
Although DSD originated in the field of alternative dispute resolution,
DSD theory has subsequently been used in a wide variety of contexts,
including international investment arbitration, international law,
international mass claims processes, federalism, and the rule of law.383
378 Cassone & Ramello, supra note 86, at 222–23.
379 See Hensler, supra note 15, at 22–23; see also Strong, Quo Vadis, supra note 34.
380 See Hensler, supra note 15, at 22–23; Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Shift Happens: Pressure on Foreign Attorney-Fee Paradigms from Class Actions, 13 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L.
125, 146–48 (2003); Strong, De-Americanization, supra note 202, at 517–22.
381 See Resolution, supra note 20, ¶ 20.
382 Franck, supra note 45, at 178.
383 See Lisa Blomgren Bingham, Reflections on Designing Governance to Produce the
Rule of Law, 2011 J. DISP. RESOL. 67, 76–78 (2011); Cohen, supra note 253, at 54–60;
Franck, supra note 45, at 177–78; Francis E. McGovern, Dispute System Design: The
United Nations Compensation Commission, 14 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 171, 176 (2009)
[hereinafter McGovern, DSD]; Erin Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1, 23,
130 (2011); Anna Spain, Integration Matters: Rethinking the Architecture of International
Dispute Resolution, 32 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1, 46–47 (2010) (discussing areas where DSD
has been used).
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While a full DSD analysis is beyond the scope of this Article,384 the
first step involves a functional analysis, which is consistent with the
methodological approach that has been used herein.385
A DSD-oriented functional analysis yields “operational criteria”
that can and should be considered in any effort to create or amend
procedures associated with bottom-up regulatory litigation.386 These
criteria “seek to better guide courts, legislatures, and administrative
agencies in tailoring mechanisms of private enforcement to the particular exigencies of the regulatory scheme and the potential privateparty regulator.”387 Therefore, when considering the proposals made
in the Resolution and evaluating the confines of any future procedures regarding a coherent system of cross-border collective redress,
European authorities should keep the following issues in mind.388
1. Allowing regulators with superior information to act first
First, “all things being equal, enforcement mechanisms should be
entrusted to, and tailored to the needs of, the regulator with superior
information relevant to potential wrongdoing.”389 The party chosen
to act as regulator not only needs to have the best access to information, but also sufficient incentive to use that information in an appropriate manner.390
Public entities have an operational advantage, and thus should be
the regulator of choice, in cases where the relevant information is particularly voluminous or complex or where a comparative analysis is
384 A full DSD analysis requires consideration of “at least eight initial variables,”
including “function, metaphor, authority and funding, size and similarity, organization and implementation, eligibility criteria, damage methodology, and compensation.” McGovern, DSD, supra note 383, at 176.
385 See supra Part III.A.
386 Glover, supra note 2, at 1144; see also Luff, supra note 8, at 113–14 (describing
how risk regulation through litigation effectively establishes a rule that “takes the
form of the remedy that attempts to influence future behavior”); McGovern, DSD,
supra note 383, 176 (describing how certain claims resolution processes can correct
the “perceived slowness, expense, and detriment to individual claims” experienced in
international arbitration); Spain, supra note 383, at 46–47 (“The use of DSD
approaches has been considered in the context of resolving international investment
disputes . . . and shows that they can increase effectiveness, efficiency, and
legitimacy.”).
387 Glover, supra note 2, at 1144–45; see McGovern, DSD, supra note 383, 176;
Spain, supra note 383, at 46–47.
388 See Resolution, supra note 20.
389 Glover, supra note 2, at 1144.
390 See id. at 1179–80.
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necessary.391 Conversely, private actors appear to be better regulators
in situations where they are geographically proximate to the cause of
the harm or where the wrongdoing is aimed toward private individuals or persons operating in a particular marketplace or similar type of
closed environment.392
This analysis suggests that the horizontal approach advocated by
the European Parliament may not be the best way to proceed, since it
appears to contemplate the adoption of a single procedure applicable
across multiple subject matter areas and therefore may not take into
account differences relating to access to information.393 Indeed, this
type of trans-substantive approach has caused some difficulties in the
United States in the past.394 However, the Resolution suggests that
some degree of procedural differentiation might be available in some
cases, such as those involving follow-on actions in the competition law
context.395 This appears to be a very good suggestion, given that follow-on actions equalize informational asymmetries by allowing private
individuals to use information gleaned during a public enforcement
process in an action for individual compensatory damages.396
This is not to say that European authorities should retain a
sectoral approach, since the current system of subject matter-specific
relief has already proven problematic.397 However, U.S. difficulties
with a trans-substantive mechanism suggest that some sort of middle
course should be charted.398
2. Avoiding over- and underdeterrence
Second, those who are involved in devising new forms of regulatory litigation need to ensure that they are creating the right regulatory balance. This could prove particularly difficult for European
authorities charged with creating a coherent European approach to
cross-border collective redress, given the various challenges associated
391 See id. at 1180.
392 See id. at 1191.
393 See Resolution, supra note 20, ¶ 20.
394 See Karayanni, supra note 113; Nagareda, supra note 10, at 7–9; Strong, Mass
Torts, supra note 78 .
395 Resolution, supra note 20, ¶ 21.
396 See Russell, supra note 34, at 147, 174.
397 See Resolution, supra note 20, ¶ 15 (“[U]ncoordinated EU initiatives in the
field of collective redress will result in a fragmentation of national procedural and
damages laws, which will weaken and not strengthen access to justice within the EU
. . . .”).
398 See id.
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with transnational regulatory litigation.399 However, the task is facilitated somewhat by the fact that the European Union has the political
authority to operate on a regional basis, at least in certain matters,
and therefore is operating in a manner that is somewhat (though not
completely) analogous to a national authority in a closed legal
system.400
When considering the various procedures that could be used to
establish a form of regulatory litigation, lawmakers must navigate
between the Scylla and Charybdis of over- and underdeterrence.
Overdeterrence can occur when the “mechanisms of private enforcement combine vis-à-vis the enforcement of a particular substantive law
to create excessive or duplicative liability that is vastly disproportionate to the underlying harm.”401 Numerous commentators have
expressed concern about situations where “a particular mechanism of
enforcement in a specific regulatory context too easily permits private
parties to extra settlement values either for meritless claims or for conduct that the relevant legislature has not even deemed wrongful.”402
Instead, “private enforcement mechanisms” need to “be integrated
with other regulatory efforts” to provide “the complete range of remedies provided in a given scheme” while still being “tailored appropriately so as not to generate over-remediation.”403
Although opponents to regulatory litigation often focus on the
issues associated with overregulation, underdeterrence can be as
much of a problem as overdeterrence.404 Indeed, commentators have
already expressed concern that the proposals outlined in the Resolu-

399 See supra Part II.
400 See Nagareda, supra note 10, at 13 (noting problems when “no formal political
state has authority of a scope commensurate with modern global business”); see also
supra note 333 and accompanying text (describing the legal parameters in which
European authorities are authorized to act). Issues relating to the way in which the
coherent European approach to cross-border collective redress will interact with the
regulatory regimes of individual Member States are beyond the scope of this Article,
although such concerns are important for the European authorities to consider.
401 Glover, supra note 2, at 1189.
402 Id.; see also Coffee, supra note 2, at 344 (acknowledging the difficulties associated with structuring adequate deterrence); Kovacic, supra note 89, at 1041 (noting
the “U.S. style of private rights of action . . . pose[ ] serious risks of overdeterrence”);
Luff, Memphis, supra note 246, at 81 (“Following administrative action with class
actions, according to critics, yields only excessive penalities rather than increased
deterrence.”).
403 Glover, supra note 2, at 1144.
404 See Buxbaum, Transnational, supra note 10, at 261.
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tion are too severe and will lead to a collective redress mechanism that
provides little, if any, regulatory value.405
When considering both over- and underdeterrence, it is important to do so from a functional perspective, since what may appear to
be a useful mechanism on the books may not be used in practice with
any frequency or efficiency.406 Indeed, this has been the problem
with many of the collective redress mechanisms that are currently in
place at the European and Member State level.407
3. Using private litigation to address harm not prevented through
regulation
Finally, in some fields, “it is implausible to ask regulatory bodies
to craft ex ante measures that anticipate all future harm or to close
every potential compliance loophole, at least without drastically overregulating on the front end so as to foreclose or discourage market
entry in the first place.”408 Indeed, the need to address unanticipated
risk is one of the primary reasons why bottom-up regulatory litigation
developed in the first place.409 Several areas of particular operational
concern have already been identified as likely candidates for regulatory litigation in the European Union.410
It is often said that regulatory litigation is less appropriate in situations where legislative or administrative bodies have either refused to
act or have provided for more traditional forms of regulation, since
that demonstrates a desire to reserve those particular subject matter
areas for public forms of regulation.411 However, some areas of regulatory activity “are characterized by historical levels of significant
underenforcement, thus necessitating private enforcement mechanisms to achieve regulatory goals.”412 In those cases, private litigation
405 See Resolution, supra note 20, ¶ 20; see supra notes 364–73 and accompanying
text.
406 See Michaels, supra note 40, at 342; see supra notes 317–19 and accompanying
text.
407 See Resolution, supra note 20, ¶¶ G–H, 3; see supra notes 317–19 and accompanying text.
408 Glover, supra note 2, at 1202; see also id. at 1144 (suggesting that private
enforcement mechanisms account for “ex post mechanisms to a regime’s comprehensive regulation of harm that is difficult to prevent ex ante”).
409 Luff, supra note 8, at 113; see supra notes 200–04 and accompanying text.
410 See supra Part III.B.2.
411 Luff, supra note 8, at 113.
412 Glover, supra note 2, at 1204; see also id. at 1144–45 (“[T]o the extent regulatory experience indicates a pattern of underenforcement by the public regulatory
body, appropriate enforcement mechanisms should be allocated to private parties to
ensure the proper achievement of regulatory goals.”).

R
R
R
R

R
R
R

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\88-2\NDL208.txt

968

unknown

Seq: 70

notre dame law review

12-FEB-13

16:10

[vol. 88:2

may act as an appropriate supplement to public forms of
regulation.413
V.

CONCLUSION

Regulatory litigation is an extremely controversial subject in both
the United States and Europe.414 While this Article has set aside the
question of whether litigation constitutes the best means of regulating
certain types of activity,415 the discussion reflected herein demonstrates how difficult the concept of regulatory litigation is to define as
a matter of both theory and practice.416 Additional challenges arise in
international and comparative contexts, since different countries not
only adopt different views about the propriety of using litigation as a
means of regulation, but also embrace different procedural means of
effectuating those regulatory aims.417
Although the term “regulatory litigation” encompasses a variety
of different procedures, this Article has focused on those involving
class and collective disputes.418 While large-scale litigation techniques
provide a useful response to many of the problems associated with
mass legal injuries, such mechanisms can trigger both regulatory and
procedural mismatches when used to address multinational harms.419
Analysis of regulatory issues in the transnational context is
becoming more and more challenging, given the wide and increasing
diversity of large-scale litigation methods currently in use around the
world.420 Longstanding antipathies towards U.S.-style class actions
often create additional difficulties,421 since the desire to distinguish
new procedures from U.S. class actions can lead either to a failure to
recognize the regulatory potential of a particular procedure (resulting
in unintended distortions to the regulatory equilibrium) or to a con413 See id. at 1204.
414 See Bignami, supra note 5, at 413; Luff, supra note 8, at 113.
415 See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
416 See supra Part III.
417 See supra Part II.
418 See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
419 See supra Part II.
420 See THE ANNALS, supra note 15.
421 Sometimes the hostility toward U.S. class actions is based on faulty information. For example, many people oppose class actions because of concerns about punitive damages, contingency fees, and broad-ranging judicial discovery, even though
those features are not actually part of the class or collective mechanism. See Baumgartner, supra note 372, at 310–11; Gidi, supra note 372, at 322, 324 n.22, 337. Similarly, class actions are commonly criticized as primarily involving frivolous claims,
even though empirical evidence suggests that is not the case. See Burch, supra note
113, at 85; Russell, supra note 34, at 150–52.
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scious effort to limit the availability of class or collective relief (resulting in a reduction in the regulatory value of the procedure, perhaps
even to the vanishing point).422
Although a final conclusion cannot be reached until European
authorities have determined the precise parameters of the proposed
pan-European approach to cross-border collective redress, it appears
highly likely that the procedures outlined in the Resolution will ultimately result in a new European form of bottom-up regulatory litigation.423 If this is indeed the case, then European authorities need to
proceed carefully, since there are signs that several of the procedures
that are currently being proposed may unintentionally diminish the
regulatory effectiveness of the collective redress mechanisms that are
to be adopted.424 Fortunately, there is still sufficient time to reverse
any trend in that regard, since the drafting and consultation process
has only just begun.425 While there are a number of ways of responding to the various concerns, this Article has provided several suggestions regarding the areas in which regulatory litigation might be most
appropriate as a functional matter,426 as well as the ways in which the
proposed procedures might be improved.427
Although this discussion has focused extensively on European
developments, there is much that American audiences can gain from
this analysis. For example, this Article provides U.S. courts with a better understanding of how the regulatory litigation process works in
the United States and other countries, thus facilitating judicial analyses regarding domestic and global class actions. U.S. legislators also
obtain a number of benefits, ranging from an alternative view on how
group litigation might proceed in domestic cases (which might assist
ongoing debates regarding class action reform in the United States)
to additional insights into issues relating to transnational regulation
(which might inspire increased attention to treaty negotiations in certain areas of law).
This Article also contains useful lessons for parties, courts, and
lawmakers outside the United States and the European Union, since
the analytical methods developed herein can be used in other jurisdictions to help improve the understanding of how regulatory litigation
422 See supra notes 36–38, 360–81, and accompanying text.
423 See Resolution, supra note 20; see also supra Part IV.
424 An ineffective mechanism would not only be harmful to the European Union’s
regulatory aims, it would also have an equally detrimental effect on any compensation
that was to be provided under the scheme.
425 See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
426 See supra Part III.B.2.
427 See supra Part IV.D.
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might operate at home and abroad. Even if some or even most states
decide not to adopt regulatory litigation into its domestic legal system,
it is useful to have an increased international appreciation for the possibilities and pitfalls of transnational regulatory litigation, since that
might lead to international efforts to either increase the effectiveness
of such lawsuits (which might occur through the adoption of formal
or informal procedural protocols such as the ones currently being
proposed by a number of North American and international organizations428) or decrease the need for such litigation (which might occur
through increased use of formal transnational regulation).429 Either
way, individuals, corporations, and states benefit through the reduction of various kinds of problems, including overdeterrence,
underdeterrence, and regulatory inconsistencies, that can arise when
courts and lawmakers do not fully understand how litigation can operate as an intended or unintended regulatory mechanism.430
Although the United States was once the only country in the
world to allow large-scale litigation, as well as so-called “private” means
of regulation, much has changed in recent years.431 Numerous countries now allow for class or collective relief as a matter of national law,
although it is unclear whether and to what extent those jurisdictions
recognize the regulatory potential of the various mechanisms.432 An
equally large number of states have abandoned the traditional command and control model of regulation, at least in some regards, and
are increasing the amount and types of private participation in regulatory endeavors.433 While the overlap between countries that have
adopted class and collective redress and countries that have adopted a
new governance approach to regulation may be only partial,434 the
simultaneous appearance of these two phenomenon suggests a heightened if not urgent need for analysis of the ways in which various forms
of class and collective relief constitute a form of regulatory litigation
on both the domestic and international levels. Large-scale legal injuries are on the rise, within and between countries, and states must find
428 See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
429 See supra Part II.
430 See supra notes 36–38, 87–89, and accompanying text.
431 See supra notes 15–16 and accompanying text.
432 See MULHERON, supra note 9, at 63–66. This is not to say that every legal system
should use class or collective relief as a regulatory mechanism, but countries should
be aware of the regulatory potential of such devices so that any unintended regulatory
effects do not arise to upset the regulatory equilibrium established by political actors.
433 See Zumbansen, supra note 4, at 201; see also Scott, supra note 1, at 651.
434 See supra notes 41–42 and accompanying text.
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an effective and principled means of addressing those issues as a matter of both regulatory and procedural law.435 Hopefully, this Article
provides a helpful first step in that regard.

435

See supra Part II.
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